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The Decency of Capital Punishment
for Minors: Contemporary Standards
and the Dignity of Juveniles
INTRODUCTION
The problem of juvenile crime is severe, both in terms of the number of
crimes committed by juveniles and the seriousness of those crimes.' In
response to what they perceive to be a national juvenile crime wave, 2 many
people are developing a "get tough" attitude toward juvenile offenders,'
reflected in an increased willingness to prosecute them as adults.4 Juveniles
may be prosecuted directly in the criminal courts or may be transferred to
1. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 220, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1104, 1106 (children between the ages of 10 and 17, numbering only
16% of the national population, accounted for more than 48% of all serious crimes: murder,
rape, assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft); Vandall, The Use of Force in Dealing
With Juveniles: Guidelines, 17 Cuim. L. BULL. 124, 124 (1981).
2. The public's perception of a current national juvenile crime wave may be inconsistent
with reality. "Current trends suggest that after many years of increase there is a significant
downturn in the level of delinquency. However, much of the current public debate is based
on an assumption of a continued rise in youth crime." Galvin & Polk, Juvenile Justice. Time
for New Direction?, 29 Ciuar & DELINQ. 325, 325 (1983). Rates of violent delinquency have
remained unchanged since the mid-1970's. Id.; see also Krisberg & Schwartz, Rethinking Juvenile
Justice, 29 CamE & DELINQ. 333, 358 (1983).
3. See, e.g., Schwartz, Getting Tough With Juveniles: Is It Working? (pt. 1), 42 PuB.
WELFARE, Summer 1984, at 40; Andersen, An Eye for an Eye, TIME, Jan. 24, 1983, at 28, 28;
Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and the Serious Young Offender: Dismantling the
"Rehabilitiative Ideal," 65 MINN. L. REv. 167 (1981) [hereinafter Juvenile Court Legislative
Reform]; Note, The Death Penalty for Juveniles-A Constitutional Alternative, 7 J. Juv. L.
54, 54 (1983).
4. Public outrage at juvenile crime is leading to increased prosecution of juvenile offenders
in the adult, or criminal, courts. "This pressure to propel more juveniles into the adult system
is predicated on the assumption that the adult criminal justice system is harsher and that
juveniles will be given stiffer punishments than they might have received from the juvenile
courts." Schwartz, supra note 3, at 40. Virtually every state provides some mechanism by which
juveniles may be prosecuted in adult criminal proceedings and subjected to adult penalties,
including the death penalty in states where the juvenile death penalty is permitted. See, e.g.,
ARiz. CONST. art. 6, § 15 (1910, amended 1960); ALA. CODE § 12-15-34 (1975); ALAsKA STAT.
§ 47.10.060 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 45417, 420 (Supp. 1985); CAL. WEau. & INsT. CODE
§§ 707 to 707.4 (West 1984); Cow. Rav. STAT. §§ 19-1-104(4)(a)-(c) to -3-108 (1973 & Supp. 1984).
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the criminal courts from the juvenile courts.5 A juvenile offender in the
criminal court is subject to adult criminal penalties, 6 including the death
5. The two principal methods by which minors are subjected to the jurisdiction of the
criminal courts are judicial waiver and legislative waiver. See Browne, Guidelines for Statutes
for Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 479, 480-81 (1977);
Schornhorst, The Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: Kent Revisited, 43 IND. L.J. 583, 596-
98 (1968); Note, Juvenile Crime: The Misguided Target of the Current Solution, 4 GLENDALE
L. REV. 97 (1982). Under judicial waiver, the juvenile court may divest itself of jurisdiction
based on its determination that a minor is not amenable to treatment or that keeping the minor
within the juvenile system would pose a danger to other juveniles in the system or to the public
safety. See Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform, supra note 3, at 178-79. The crimes for
which, and the age above which, jurisdiction may be waived vary from state to state. See
Comment, Capital Punishment for Minors: An Eighth Amendment Analysis, 74 J. CRnJ. L.
& CRImINOLOGY 1471, 1477 n.47 (1983). Legislative waiver means that minors charged with
certain crimes automatically fall within criminal court jurisdiction, by statutory command.
These are typically capital crimes and other serious offenses. Again, the age above which a
minor may be transferred by legislative waiver varies from state to state. See generally Feld,
Legislative Policies toward the Serious Juvenile Offender, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 497, 508 (1981)
[hereinafter Legislative Policies]; Schornhorst, supra at 596; Comment, supra at 1479 nn.60-61.
A discussion of the transfer of juveniles to the criminal courts is beyond the scope of this
Note. For more complete treatment of waiver see the sources cited supra and Note, Waiver in
Indiana-A Conflict With the Goals of the Juvenile Justice System, 53 IND. L.J. 601 (1978).
This Note assumes, for purposes of analysis, that a juvenile has been transferred to the criminal
court, has there been found guilty of a capital offense, and faces a possible sentence of death.
Only the propriety of imposing the sentence of death on the minor will be discussed herein.
6. See statutes cited supra note 4. By contrast, juvenile court jurisdiction does not entail
an adjudication of guilt or innocence, and is therefore not regarded as a criminal proceeding.
The presumption of the juvenile court system is that minors are not completely responsible for
their actions and should therefore be treated with more solicitude than adult offenders. See
Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1189 (1970);
Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965
Wis. L. REv. 7, 9-10. Therefore, the goal of the juvenile court system is to rehabilitate, rather
than to punish, and to provide individualized treatment. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 554-55 (1966) ("The Juvenile Court is theoretically engaged in determining the needs of
the child and of society rather than adjudicating criminal conduct. The objectives are to provide
measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix
criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment. The state is parenspatriae rather than prosecuting
attorney and judge."). Recently, some commentators have begun to question the continued
validity of the rehabilitative ideal, while some state legislatures have abandoned the traditional
rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile courts in favor of a more punitive philosophy. See
generally S. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEm § 1.3, at 1-4 to -6 (2d
ed. 1985). Nevertheless, the idea that juvenile offenders deserve treatment, not punishment,
continues to guide most juvenile courts. See id. at 1-4 (rehabilitative philosophy of juvenile
court has for the most part survived). The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges has strongly reaffirmed the rehabilitative ideal, stating that "proposals which would
materially and adversely alter traditional individualized rehabilitative models and treatment
philosphies of the juvenile justice system are unacceptable." Preamble, The Juvenile Court and
Serious Offenders: 38 Recommendations, 35 Juv. & FAm. CT. J., Summer 1984.
The adult or criminal court system, on the other hand, presumes responsible actors who
make blameworthy choices, punishing them in proportion to the gravity of their offenses. Feld,
Reference of Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative to Asking
Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 515, 515 n.l (1978) [hereinafter Reference of
Juvenile Offenders]. The maximum sentence that may be imposed by a juvenile court is detention
until the age of majority. Id. at 524.
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penalty.7
In the 1982 case of Eddings v. Oklahoma," the United States Supreme
Court was asked to decide whether the eighth and fourteenth amendments
to the Constitution prohibited the execution of a person who was sixteen at
the time of his offense. 9 Although the Court had granted certiorari on that
issue, a majority of the Court held on other grounds that the death penalty
had been improperly imposed on the defendant Eddings. Because the Okla-
homa trial court had failed to consider mitigating evidence concerning the
defendant's violent family background and personal history in its sentencing
decision, 0 the Court reversed the sentence and remanded the case for further
proceedings. I
Although the Court in Eddings did not hold that the Constitution forbade
the execution of a minor, or of a person for a crime committed as a minor,'
2
the Court's opinion clearly requires that minority be given special attention
as a mitigating factor in sentencing for capital crimes, due to the inherent
immaturity and irresponsibility of youth. 3 Since Eddings, some state courts
7. In most capital punishment states, courts may sentence a minor convicted of a capital
crime to death. Brief for Respondent at 19, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). Some
states forbid the imposition of the death penalty upon persons who were under 18 at the time
of the offense. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5 (West Supk. 1986); CoLo. REv. STAT. §
16-11-103(1)(a) (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(g)(1) (West 1985); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-105.01 (Supp. 1984);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.02(A) (Page 1982). N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(b) (McKinney
1975) prohibits capital punishment of persons under 19 years of age, while TEXAS PENAL CODE
ANN. § 8.07(d) (Vernon Supp. 1986) limits the death penalty to offenders over 17, and NEv.
REv. STAT. § 176.025 (1986) prohibits the execution of persons under 16.
8. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
9. Id. at 120 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 113. The majority held that the trial judge violated the rule of Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586 (1978), "that the sentencer... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record.. .that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (emphasis in original). The
trial judge had erroneously found as a matter of law that he was unable to consider the fact
of Eddings' violent background as a mitigating factor. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113. The state
appellate court took the same approach, considering "only that evidence to be mitigating which
would tend to support a legal excuse from criminal liability." Id. The rule in Lockett requires
the sentencer in capital cases to consider any relevant mitigating factor proffered by the
defendant. Id. at 113-15. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that each sentence of
death comports with the eighth amendment principles that govern the death penalty generally.
See infra notes 27-60 and accompanying text.
11. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 117.
12. Id. at 116.
13.
[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when
a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage. Our
history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their
earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults. Particularly
"during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the
19861
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
have relied on the defendant's minority at the time of the crime, either by
itself or in combination with evidence about the defendant's background
and maturity, as the decisive factor militating against the death penalty.' 4
In states which permit the execution of minors, however, minority is only
a mitigating factor, and cannot prevent the death penalty as a matter of
law. '5 Thus, many state appellate courts have upheld juvenile death penalties,
rejdcting pleas for leniency based on the defendants' youth at the time of
the crime.' 6 Even state appellate courts that have overturned minors' death
penalties in particular cases remain ready to uphold that penalty in the future
should youth be found to have too little mitigating weight. 17
This Note argues that the consideration of youth merely as a mitigating
factor is insufficient to guarantee the constitutionality of individual juvenile
experience, perspective, and judgment" expected of adults.
Id. at 115-16 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979)); see also
id. at 116 ("the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of great
weight"); Comment, Eighth Amendment-Minors and the Death Penalty: Decision and Avoid-
ance, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982), 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1525, 1538
(1982) (mitigating factor in Eddings was the well-established one of youth).
14. See, e.g., State v. Valencia, 132 Ariz. 248, 250, 645 P.2d 239, 241 (1982) (single factor
of defendant's age sufficiently substantial to call for life imprisonment, despite aggravating
circumstances surrounding crime of murder); Legare v. State, 250 Ga. 875, 875, 302 S.E.2d
351, 352 (1983) (state must allow consideration of any relevant mitigating evidence, including
defendant's age and turbulent family history).
15. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(7) (1975); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(5)
(Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1304(4) (1977); MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(g) (Supp.
1985).
16. See, e.g., Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387, 428, 478 A.2d 1143, 1164 (1984) ("We simply
hold that on the facts of this case, Trimble's age-17 years and 8 months-does not engage
the Eighth Amendment as a shield to capital punishment."); High v. Zant, 250 Ga. 693, 701,
300 S.E.2d 654, 662 (1983) (death penalty not cruel and unusual punishment per se simply
because defendant was a minor at time of offense); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671,
680 (Ky. 1984) (minority is an important factor to consider in sentencing, but it is not a
constitutional distinction between juveniles and adults); State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487, 494
n.7 (Mo. banc 1983) (imposition of death penalty is not cruel and unusual punishment per se
simply because the defendant was a minor at the time of the offense).
The fact that sentencers have often imposed the death penalty on a juvenile, and that
appellate courts have often upheld these penalties, does not indicate that death is an appropriate
punishment for the juvenile murderer. As this Note will explain infra notes 84-89 and accom-
panying text, state courts have not come to a clear consensus regarding the propriety of the
juvenile death penalty. One could also list cases in which appellate courts have overturned a
minor's death sentence. See cases cited infra note 89. Strong evidence exists that courts and
juries are reluctant to impose the juvenile death penalty, so that the occasional death sentences
meted out by sentencers do not suggest a societal trend in favor of putting juveniles to death.
See infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text. While the attitudes of courts and juries are
important to a court's analysis of a punishmerit under the cruel and unusual punishment clause
of the eighth amendment, these attitudes provide too ambiguous an indicator to guide the
constitutional inquiry here. See infra notes 61-98 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Cannaday v. State, 455 So. 2d 713, 725 (Miss. 1984) ("Even though we grant
Cannaday a new trial on the sentence phase, her age at the time of the crime remains a
mitigating factor to be considered by the jury. Her age by itself is not grounds for reversal.");
Valencia, 132 Ariz. at 250, 645 P.2d at 241 ("[W]e do not hold that age alone will always act
to require life imprisonment in every case of first degree murder ....").
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death penalties because the death penalty is always inappropriate for minors.' 8
18. For the purposes of this Note, the juvenile death penalty refers not only to the execution
of a minor, but also to the execution of an adult who was a minor at the time of the offense.
This Note will not discuss the issue of the appropriate cutoff age for the death penalty.
Throughout the Note, the terms "minors" and "juveniles" have been used to refer to minors
under the age of 18, since most jurisdictions use 18 as the cutoff age for juvenile court
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 5, at 1476 n.39. In choosing an appropriate cutoff
age for imposition of the death penalty, courts and legislatures might take notice of the fact
that 18 is the age at which individuals first enjoy many of the privileges of adulthood. See,
e.g., U.S. CONsT. amend. XXVI, § 1 (right to vote). The American Law Institute takes the
position that 18 is the age below which persons should not receive the death penalty. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.6 comment 5 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980). Several states
that permit capital punishment for crimes committed as adults have forbidden it for crimes
committed by persons under 18. See statutes cited supra note 7. Although a line drawn at 18
may falsely assume that virtually all capital offenders over 18 are mature enough to receive
the death penalty, it has the virtue of being consistent with most of society's laws distinguishing
children from adults. See infra notes 99-135 and accompanying text. Offenders over the cutoff
age would still be free to present youth and immaturity as mitigating factors. See supra notes
12-17 and accompanying text.
This Note does not explicitly address the issue of the appropriate punishment for juveniles
convicted of capital crimes, should the juvenile death penalty be declared unconstitutional.
Proponents of the juvenile death penalty argue against alternative punishments, often making
emotional appeals based on the brutality of murders committed by juveniles. See sources cited
supra note 3. Such appeals have little constitutional significance, since the constitutionality of
a punishment depends on each offender's personal culpability for the harm done, and not only
on the brutality of the crime. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. Other supporters
of the juvenile death penalty argue that society must protect itself from violent juvenile offenders,
and that trying these youths in criminal court and subjecting them to adult criminal penalties,
including the death penalty, is the best way to contain violent juvenile crime. See, e.g., Note,
supra note 3, at 54-55. The crux of this argument is that the juvenile justice system is an
inappropriate place to deal with violent and dangerous juveniles. Violent juveniles are typically
near the maximum age limit for juvenile court jurisdiction, and have often been through the
juvenile system before but have failed to respond to rehabilitative treatment. Thus, the rationale
for continued treatment in the juvenile justice system is diminished. Id. at 56. Moreover, placing
violent juveniles in the juvenile system poses a threat to society, since these juveniles may
corrupt other, non-violent youths. Finally, society's moral outrage at violent youth crime may
require that serious juvenile offenders suffer full adult penalties. Id. at 57.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that society's efforts to thwart juvenile crime must
include the juvenile death penalty. This Note does not take issue with the argument that society
must protect itself from violent offenders, be they minors or adults, nor does the Note oppose
the transfer of serious juvenile offenders to the criminal courts. Although the Note argues that
the decision to try a minor in the criminal courts rather than treat him or her in the juvenile
justice system does not involve a finding of adult maturity or moral responsibility, see infra
notes 80-82 and accompanying text, the Note does not suggest that truly dangerous juvenile
offenders remain in the juvenile system. The point that waiver does not involve a finding of
maturity is part of a larger argument that even juvenile murderers are less mature and less
responsible than adults, and therefore should suffer less severe punishments than adults. See
infra notes 61-156 and accompanying text.
Many commentators have noted the problem posed by keeping violent juveniles in the
juvenile justice system. As Zimring has observed:
The disadvantages of a sentencing structure that retains jurisdiction in the juvenile
court for serious offenses of violence concern the low maximum sanctions prac-
tically available in the juvenile court and the special pressures that serious, violent
crimes place on community acceptance of the juvenile court as an institution for
dealing with youth crime. For offenses such as murder and armed robbery, low
19861
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In order to pass constitutional muster under the eighth amendment's cruel
and unusual punishment clause, each sentence of death must neither offend
contemporary standards of decency 9 nor be excessive for the particular
offense. 20 Although the death penalty is not unconstitutional per se, 21 this
Note will demonstrate that the death penalty always violates the eighth
amendment when applied to minors. 22 Since sentencers are presently entitled
to impose the death penalty despite mitigating factors proffered by the
defendant, 23 using youth as only a mitigating factor risks imposing the death
penalty unconstitutionally.
This Note will first present the eighth amendment principles by which the
validity of punishments are judged. 24 With this necessary background estab-
lished, the Note will then show that society's standards of decency, embodied
in the many statutory and judicial restraints placed upon minors due to their
presumed immaturity, do not support a juvenile death penalty. 25 Moreover,
the inherent immaturity and irresponsibility of youth, as recognized in the
law, renders a death penalty for minors excessive in every case.26
maximum sentences lessen the capacity of the criminal justice system to incapa-
citate offenders from further crime in the community and may lessen the general
deterrent effect of the legal threats directed at young offenders.
Zimring, Background Paper, in TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY
TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 98 (1978). These commentators have
typically concluded that waiver to the criminal courts and the imposition of criminal punishments
are appropriate responses to violent juvenile crime. See, e.g., id. at 99; see also R. LUNDMAN,
PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 233-35 (1984). At the same time, however,
commentators recommend that juveniles receive less than the maximum penalty imposed upon
adults, arguing that incarceration is sufficient to control juvenile crime. See, e.g., R. LUNDmAN,
supra, at 233 ("Recent research leaves little doubt that incarceration suppresses involvement in
delinquency."); Zimring, supra, at 100 ("Maximum sanctions for young violent offenders tried
in criminal court should be higher than those for violent juvenile offenders but lower than
those for violent adult offenders.").
Minors can certainly be tried in the criminal courts without facing the severest penalties
society can impose, and yet receive penalties sufficient to protect society from their violent
propensities. For example, some states which prohibit the death penalty for persons who were
under 18 at the time of their crime still impose a sentence of life imprisonment. See, e.g.,
People v. Clements, 135 Il. App. 3d 1001, 482 N.E.2d 675 (1985); People v. Taylor, 102 Ill.
2d 201, 464 N.E.2d 1059 (1984). Imprisonment, even for life, is a less severe punishment than
death as a matter of eighth amendment analysis. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 134 Ill. App.
3d 582, 480 N.E.2d 1147, 1154 (1985) ("We see no inconsistency in a legislative scheme which
subjects minors to natural life imprisonment but mercifully exempts them from the death
penalty, for 'the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment,
however long.' ") (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)). Thus
imprisonment, even for life, would be both a constitutional and a sufficient response to society's
need to contain violent juvenile crime.
19. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
21. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 1.S. 153 (1976).
22. See infra notes 67-206 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Trimble, 300 Md. at 428, 478 A.2d at 1164.
24. See infra notes 27-60 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 67-156 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 157-205 and accompanying text.
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I. EIGHTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROHIBITIONS AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
The eighth amendment to the Constitution states that "[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." 27 While the Supreme Court has never precisely de-
fined the meaning of the cruel and unusual punishment clause, 28 it has
discovered several principles within the clause by which the constitutionality
of a punishment may be judged. 29 Two of these principles are relevant to
the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty for the crimes of a minor.
First, a punishment must not offend society's "evolving standards of de-
cency." 3 0 In determining whether a punishment is acceptable to society, the
Court will look at objective indicators of societal standards, such as the
history of the particular punishment, current legislation, jury verdicts, a' and
international opinion.3 2 Second, a penalty must not offend the "dignity of
man" which is the "basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment. ' 33 A
punishment violates the dignity of man principle if it is excessive,3 4 either
by being disproportionate to the crime or by making no measurable con-
tribution to acceptable goals of punishment. 35
27. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962), the
Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment applies to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
28. See Trop v. Dulles, 365 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) (exact scope of the phrase "cruel and
unusual" has never been detailed by the Court). See generally Radin, The Jurisprudence of
Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv.
989 (1978); Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted". The Original Meaning,
57 CALiF. L. REv. 839 (1969).
29. Early cases considering the death penalty and its validity under the eighth amendment
dealt with methods of execution, and not the constitutionality of the death penalty per se. See,
e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
These cases stand for the proposition that the cruel and unusual punishment clause forbids
punishments that are inherently cruel or barbarous. This principle is irrelevant to the issue of
this Note, since the Supreme Court has held that the death penalty is not inherently cruel.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 178 (1976).
The cruel and unusual punishment clause also places substantial limits on what can be made
criminal and be punished. See, e.g., Robinson, 370 U.S. 660 (it is "cruel and unusual" to
impose any punishment for an individual's status or condition). An exploration of what may
be made criminal under the eighth amendment is also irrelevant to the inquiry of this Note.
30. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
31. Id. at 176-82. The Supreme Court has determined that the death penalty, in general,
is not unacceptable to contemporary society. Id.; see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1976).
32. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982).
33. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
34. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. See infra text accompanying notes
36-40.




A punishment is disproportionate if it is more punishment than the of-
fender deserves.16 In considering the constitutionality of a punishment in the
abstract, a court must weigh the severity of the punishment against the
degree of harm done to the victim.3 7 Thus, the Supreme Court has held that
death is not disproportionate per se as a penalty to the crime of murder.' s
A court must also consider the personal culpability, or moral guilt, of the
offender in each particular case to determine whether the punishment is
disproportionate to the crime.39 The court must examine each offender's
personal responsibility for the harm done, not only the degree of harm to
the victim. In order to deserve a particular punishment, the offender must
be as culpable as others receiving the same punishment for a similar crime.40
36. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
37. See, e.g., Coker, 433 U.S. 584 (holding that death penalty is always disproportionate
to the crime of rape, since rapists do not take their victims' lives).
38. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176.
39. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 800; see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding that
a capital defendant has an eighth amendment right to a sentencing authority with the power
to consider any and all aspects of his character, record and offense that he wishes to proffer
as mitigating circumstances). The purpose of individualized sentencing determinations is to
ensure that each capital sentence meets eighth amendment standards of decency and dignity of
man principles. Hertz & Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio
and the Capital Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CALIn. L.
Rav. 317, 322-37 (1981).
40. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 787. The issue presented in Enmund was whether the eighth
amendment permits imposition of the death penalty on one who aids and abets a felony in the
course of which a murder is committed by others, but who does not himself kill, attempt to
kill, or intend that a killing take place. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 786-87. The Court concluded
that the death penalty would be disproportionate if imposed upon Enmund, who did not
actually kill the victims:
The question before us is not the disproportionality of death as a penalty for
murder, but rather the validity of capital punishment for Enmund's own conduct.
The focus must be on his culpability, not on that of those who committed the
robbery and shot the victims, for we insist on "individual consideration as a
constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence[.]"
Id. at 798 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)) (emphasis in original). Thus,
Enmund stands for the proposition that an offender, to deserve capital punishment, must be
as culpable as others who receive the same punishment for a similar crime. See Comment,
supra note 5, at 1492 ("The thrust of Enmund... is a focus on individuals and their responsibility
for the harms done, rather than on the crimes for which the offenders were convicted or the
consequences to the victims."); Note, Eighth Amendment: The Death Penalty and Vicarious
Felony Murder: Nontriggerman May Not be Executed Absent a Finding of Intent to Kill, 73
J. CiR. L. & CRMINOLOGY 1553, 1564 (1983) (capital punishment is to be imposed only on
those who are deserving of society's ultimate sanction).
In Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984), the Supreme Court decided that the eighth
amendment does not require a state appellate court to compare the sentence in a capital case
with those in similar cases to make a determination of proportionality. This was not an
elimination of the disproportionality arm of eighth amendment analysis. In order to deserve
capital punishment, a defendant must still be personally culpable for his crime. Pulley merely
stands for the proposition that, once a finding of personal culpability has been made and the
defendant has been sentenced to death, the death penalty need not be overturned upon a finding
that death is seldom imposed upon defendants convicted of similar crimes. See generally
Liebman, Appellate Review of Death Sentences: A Critique of Proportionality Review, 18
U.C.D. L. REV. 1433 (1985).
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To satisfy the "dignity of man" principle of the eighth amendment, a
punishment must also make a "measurable contribution to acceptable goals
of punishment. ' ' 41 A penalty "so totally without penological justification
that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering" would violate the
dignity of man principle. 42 The Supreme Court has recognized two basic
penological goals of the death penalty: retribution and the deterrence of
capital crimes by prospective offenders.4 3 Capital punishment fulfills its
retributive purpose by providing an institutional means for society to express
its moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct, and by satisfying society's
desire that criminals receive the punishments they deserve. 44 Capital punish-
ment therefore preserves the stability of society by providing an alternative
to citizens taking the law into their own hands in seeking revenge upon
criminals. 45 Although research has never conclusively demonstrated the death
penalty's deterrent effect, the Court has held that it will defer to the judgment
of state legislatures which determine that the death penalty does, indeed,
deter capital crimes.46
The Court has held that the death penalty, in general, serves the penological
purposes of retribution and deterrence. 47 As in the disproportionality analysis,
however, each particular case must be examined to determine whether the
death penalty serves valid penological purposes.4 The goal of retribution is
41. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
42. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182-83.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 183-84.
45. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("When
people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal
offenders the punishment they 'deserve,' then there are sown the seeds of anarchy-of self-
help, vigilante justice, and lynch law."). Society may also validly decide that some crimes are
so heinous, the only appropriate response is to execute the offender. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183-
84. See generally Comment, supra note 5, at 1506-10; The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90
HARv. L. REv. 55, 65-66 (1976).
46.
Although some of the studies suggest that the death penalty may not function as
a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties, there is no convincing em-
pirical evidence either supporting or refuting this view. We may nevertheless
assume safely that there are murderers, such as those who act in passion, for
whom the death penalty has little or no deterrent effect. But for many others,
the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent....
The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex factual
issue the resolution of which properly rests with the legislatures, which can evaluate
the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and with a
flexibility of approach that is not available to the courts.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185-86.
47. Id. at 176-87.
48. "Unless the death penalty when applied to those in Enmund's position measurably
contributes to one or both of these [penological] goals, it 'is nothing more than the purposeless
and needless imposition of pain and suffering,' and hence an unconstitutional punishment."
Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)). See Hertz &
Weisberg, supra note 39, at 335-37.
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served only when the offender is personally culpable for the crime, and
therefore deserves the punishment.4 9 Capital punishment will serve as a
deterrent only when it will send a message to potential murderers that society
will respond harshly to their actions.5 0 This message is sent by the execution
of a murderer with whose character and actions a potential murderer can
identify. 51 Therefore, examination of the personal culpability, or moral guilt,
of each capital defendant, along with the circumstances of his crime, is
required to deterrnine whether his execution is deserved and would serve to
deter potential criminals contemplating similar acts. 52
As a further safeguard against violations of the eighth amendment in
capital cases, no doubt must exist as to the appropriateness of imposing the
death penalty on a particular defendant 3. 5 The purpose of the requirements
that each sentence of death respect the dignity of man underlying the eighth
amendment, and that each defendant have an opportunity to present evidence
of mitigating circumstances which argue against the death penalty, is to
ensure that no undeserved or unjustified executions will be carried out. 54 A
49. Thus, in Enmund, retribution was an insufficient justification for executing a defendant
who had not intended that a murder be committed. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801; see also Tucker
v. Zant, 724 F.2d 882, 887-88 (1Ith Cir. 1984) (retributive justification requires that capital
punishment be imposed only on defendants deserving of society's ultimate sanction); Comment,
supra note 5, at 1509-10 (retributive theory is based on idea that punishment is proportionate
to culpability of offender).
50. Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949,
950-51 (1966).
51. Liebman & Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the "Boiler Plate":
Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEo. L.J. 757, 813-17 (1978).
52. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799-801. In Enmund, the Court held that the deterrence goal
would not be served by executing one who had not killed or intended to kill. A premeditative
killer would not have been able to identify with Enmund, while one without a prior intent to
kill would have been incapable of altering his conduct in contemplation of Enmund's execution.
"[Ilt seems likely that 'capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the
result of premeditation and deliberation[.]' " Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799 (quoting Fisher v.
United States, 328 U.S. 463, 484 (1946)).
53. See Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2748 (1983) (opinion of Burger, C.J.) ("qualitative
difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when the
death sentence is imposed"); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (death penalty must not be imposed in
face of evidence which creates reasonable or substantial doubt of appropriateness of that
penalty); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (due to severity of death
penalty, need for reliability in determination that death is the appropriate penalty in a specific
case is great); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 81 (Utah 1982) (respect for humanity underlying
the eighth amendment can be upheld only if death penalty is imposed on the basis of a high
degree of confidence that it is appropriate in a specific case).
54. See, e.g., Zant, 103 S. Ct. at 2747 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358
(1977)) ("It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision
to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or
emotion."); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (risk that death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors
calling for less severe penalty is unacceptable); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 ("fundamental respect
'for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment.. .requires consideration of the character and
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a consti-
tutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death"); see also Ritter
[Vol. 61:757
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR MINORS
court must resolve any doubt regarding the propriety of the death penalty
in favor of the defendant.
5 5
The standards of decency and dignity of man principles technically are
not two distinct tests, both of which must be satisfied before a punishment
will pass constitutional muster. The Supreme Court has made clear that,
although it will afford great weight to evidence of society's standards of
decency, the ultimate decision as to whether the eighth amendment permits
imposition of a punishment belongs to the Court, through its application
of the dignity of man principle.16 Nevertheless, legislative judgments, jury
verdicts, and other indicators of society's standards, even if not controlling
in themselves, are important to the Court's dignity of man analysis.5 7 The
v. Smith, 726 F.2d 1505, 1515 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (individualized determination of appropriateness
of death penalty is designed to ensure fairness to accused).
55.
As the Supreme Court has explained, the standard of proof in a guilt proceeding
is the rigorous criterion of beyond a reasonable doubt because of our society's
judgment that an erroneous decision to convict is more opprobrious than an
erroneous decision to acquit. In the capital sentence proceeding, the comparative
weight of the interests at stake is even more sharply pronounced. An erroneous
decision to extinguish the defendant's life is far more opprobrious than an er-
roneous decision to spare the defendant and sentence him to life imprisonment.
Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 39, at 376.
56. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797; Coker, 433 U.S. at 597; see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at
173 (public perceptions of standards of decency are not in themselves conclusive).
57. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175 ("the constitutional test is intertwined with an assessment
of contemporary standards"). For example, the Court has held that it owes great deference to
legislative judgments on appropriate punishments, because state legislatures are presumptively
accurate indicators of the standards of contemporary society. Id. at 175; see also Furman, 408
U.S. at 383 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[In a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are
constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people.").
At times, the Court has seemed to use contemporary standards of decency as only a single
factor in its dignity of man analysis. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797; Coker, 433 U.S. at 597.
This has led some commentators to conclude that standards of decency no longer deserve an
independent eighth amendment inquiry. See Radin, Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Respect
for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1145 n.6 (1980); Comment,
supra note 5, at 1488-89.
In the cases that seemed to subsume standards of decency under the dignity of man umbrella,
however, the Court, having first explored those standards for the punishment in question and
stated the principle that evidence of contemporary standards is not controlling, proceeded to
hold the punishment unconstitutional in accord with what the standards of society seemed to
indicate. Thus, in Coker v. Georgia, the Court found that only three states sanctioned the
death penalty for the rape of an adult woman. 433 U.S. at 594. In Enmund v. Florida, the
Court found that only eight states authorized capital punishment for "nontriggerman" ac-
complices to felony murders. 458 U.S. at 789. In both cases, the Court concluded that the
death penalty would violate national standards of decency.
Therefore, the Court has not relegated standards of decency to an insignificant role in eighth
amendment analysis, but has merely reserved the right to override those standards in an
appropriate case. See, e.g., Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797 ("Although the judgments of legislatures,
juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us ultimately to judge whether
the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty."); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173
("But our cases also make clear that public perceptions of standards of decency with respect
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Court's conclusion as to society's acceptance of a punishment is typically
consistent with its ruling as to the constitutionality of that punishment. 8
Therefore, an independent investigation of society's standards of decency
with regard to the juvenile death penalty is a valid and important ingredient
of the eighth amendment analysis.
In the next section, the Note will demonstrate that society's contemporary
standards of decency are violated by the juvenile death penalty, rendering
it unconstitutional per se.59 The conclusions about the immaturity of youth
drawn from the standards of decency analysis will also guide the dignity of
man analysis, where it will be shown that the common characteristics of
juvenile offenders must render the death penalty excessive in every instance. 60
II. SOCIETY'S EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY
AND THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
In determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual under the eighth
amendment, a court must decide whether the punishment violates society's
evolving standards of decency. 6' In doing so, courts must consider various
objective indicators of "contemporary values concerning the infliction of a
challenged sanction. ' 62 These include the historical development of the pun-
ishment at issue, legislative judgments, the sentencing decisions of juries,
and international opinion.63
to criminal sanctions are not conclusive. A penalty also must accord with the 'dignity of man,'
which is the 'basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.' ") (quoting Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)). Moreover, courts and commentators have continued to treat standards
of decency as an independent inquiry. See, e.g., Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387, 428, 478 A.2d
1143, 1161 (1984); Hill, Can the Death Penalty Be Imposed on Juveniles: The Unanswered
Question in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 20 CRIM. L. BULL. 5 (1984); Gwin, The Death Penalty:
Cruel and Unusual Punishment When Imposed Upon Juveniles, 45 Ky. BENCH & B., April
1981, at 16; Note, Juvenile Offenders and the Electric Chair: Cruel and Unusual Punishment
or Firm Discipline for the Hopelessly Delinquent?, 35 U. FLA. L. Rav. 344, 359-66 (1983);
Note, The Death Penalty for Juveniles: A Constitutional Alternative, 7 J. Juv. L. 54, 59
(1983).
58. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text & note 57; see also Radin, supra note
57, at 1145 n.6 (contemporary standards of decency give moral content to the dignity of man
standard).
59. See infra notes 67-156 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 157-205 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
62. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 179-82 (1976); see also Hertz & Weisberg, supra
note 39, at 334.
63. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-89 (1982); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-82. Some
commentators include public opinion polls on the list of indicators. See Gwin, supra note 57,
at 17; Note, Juvenile Offenders and the Electric Chair: Cruel and Unusual Punishment or Firm
Discipline for the Hopelessly Delinquent?, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 344, 362 (1983). The Supreme
Court, however, looks to legislative enactments and jury sentencing decisions as reliable indicia
of public opinion, rather than to direct samples of public attitudes. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S.
at 174 (legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining contemporary standards); Witherspoon
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A consideration of these traditional indicators is inconclusive as to whether
society favors a death penalty for minors. 64 This Note will consider an
alternative indicator, however, which consists of the many statutory and
judicial restraints placed upon minors for their protection and safety, due
to their assumed immaturity and irresponsibility. The protective attitudes
embodied in these restraints do not support a juvenile death penalty.- The
Note will also show that juveniles who commit crimes, even serious crimes,
should be regarded with the same benevolent attitude that society displays
towards minors in general. 66
A. A Traditional Standards of Decency Analysis
Minors have been sentenced to death and executed in the United States
since colonial times. 67 Death sentences for minors have continued into the
present day, with the most recent execution for a crime committed as a
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) (juries maintain link between community values and
penal system without which punishments could not reflect evolving standards of decency).
Moreover, public opinion polls are fraught with methodological difficulties. See, e.g., Ellsworth
& Ross, Public Opinion & Capital Punishment: A Close Examination of the Views of Aboli-
tionists and Retentionists, 29 CRimE & DELINQ. 116, 165 (1983) (concluding that the typical
public opinion poll renders meaningless results for court capital punishment determinations).
It has also been argued that reliance on public opinion polls in constitutional adjudications
would lead to unconstitutional results. See, e.g., Warr & Stafford, Public Goals of Punishment
and Support for the Death Penalty, 21 J. REsEARcH CiuME & DELINQ. 95, 107 (1984) (public
opinion should not govern penal policy, since a principal aim of western legal systems is to
protect offenders from public opinion, and because criminal statutes cannot be expected to
change with changing public opinion); Radin, supra note 28, at 1035-36 ("Any degree of
reliance on public opinion polls, even if accompanied by disclaimers as to their weight, is
improper in constitutional adjudication. Opinion polls, ironically, show that the majority of
the public favors few of the protections embodied in the Bill of Rights."); Ellsworth & Ross,
supra, at 166 (authors' survey of 500 northern California residents showed a majority in favor
of a mandatory death penalty, which had been held unconstitutional in Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)). For these reasons, this Note will not consider public opinion
as an indicator of standards of decency.
64. See infra notes 67-99 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 100-35 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 136-207 and accompanying text.
67. See A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAvEES: THE INVENTION oF DELINQUENCY 211-12 (2d ed.
1977). Through the nineteenth century, the English common law rules concerning the criminal
liability of children and older adolescents were applied in the United States. Children under
the age of seven were presumed to be incapable of forming criminal intent, and viere thus not
held liable for their criminal acts. Frey, The Criminal Responsibility of the Juvenile Murderer,
1970 WAsH. U.L.Q. 113, 113. For persons aged 7 to 14, the presumption of inability to
entertain criminal intent became rebuttable, and if rebutted, the child could be convicted of a
crime and even sentenced to death. Streib, Death Penalty for Children: The American Experience
with Capital Punishment for Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L. REv.
613, 614 (1983). No such presumption applied to persons aged 14 or over. Id. Prior to 1900,
95 children were executed in the United States, the youngest aged 10 years, the earliest recorded
incident being in 1642 in Massachusetts. Id. at 619.
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minor having taken placed in January, 1986.6 Currently, at least thirty-two
inmates are on death row for offenses committed while under the age of
eighteen. 69 Clearly, society has been, and is still, willing to sentence minors
to death.
Societal attitudes towards juvenile offenders are also reflected in the de-
velopment of a special juvenile justice system, the purpose of which is to
rehabilitate, not to punish. 70 Today, virtually every state has a juvenile court
system designed to give special treatment to young offenders. 7' Juvenile court
proceedings are not considered to be criminal proceedings, and do not result
in criminal punishments. 72 The historical premise of the juvenile court system
is that minors are not totally responsible for their offenses and therefore
should be treated more benignly than their adult counterparts. 73 This premise
is still the basis of today's juvenile justice system. 74 "The state is parens
patriae rather than prosecuting attorney and judge, ' 75 and in that capacity
aids but does not punish young offenders. That the state should take this
role is supported by the widely held view that juvenile crime results from
environmental factors for which society must share the blame;76 it is therefore
68. James Terry Roach was executed in South Carolina on January 14, 1986, for a murder
he committed when he was 17. He thus became the first person to be executed against his will
for a crime committed while under 18 since executions resumed in 1977. N.Y. Times, Jan. 18,
1986, at 8, col. 1. Charles Rumbaugh was executed in Texas on September 11, 1985, for a
murder he committed when he was 17. Reinhold, Execution for Juveniles: New Focus on Old
Issue, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1985, at A14, col. 1. The next most recent execution of a person
for a crime committed while a minor took place in 1964. Streib, supra note 67, at 619.
69. See Reinhold, supra note 68.
70. In the 1820's, reformers began seeking to put an end to the imposition of adult
punishments on minors, having as their goal the rehabilitation of the young offender. See
generally A. PLATT, supra note 67; Fox, supra note 4; Mennell, Origins of the Juvenile Court:
Changing Perspectives on the Legal Rights of Juvenile Delinquents, 18 CsuMA & DELINQ. 68
(1972). The goals of the early juvenile justice reformers have also been described by the Supreme
Court. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967). See generally supra note 6.
71. The juvenile justice reform movement culminated in the creation of juvenile courts,
designed exclusively for young offenders, and authorized to make dispositions suited to the
goals of rehabilitation. See Simpson, Rehabilitation as Justification of a Separate Juvenile
Justice System, 64 CAL. L. REv. 984, 984 (1976). The first juvenile court was established in
Illinois in 1899. By 1925, virtually every state had followed suit. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14-
15. All the juvenile court systems pursued the goal of rehabilitation. See Paulsen, Fairness to
the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547 (1957).
72. See supra note 6.
73. Id.
74. See supra note 5; see also Allen, The Juvenile Court and the Limits of Juvenile Justice,
11 WAYNE L. REv. 676 (1965); Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 281 (1967).
75. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
76. "[Y]outh crime as such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the young
also represent a failure of family, school, and the social system, which share responsibility for
the development of America's youth." TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING
POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 7 (1978) [hereinafter TWEN-
TIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE].
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inappropriate to punish youthful trangressors for crimes that are the result
of society's failures."
Despite the ideals of the juvenile justice system, society has not held all
juvenile offenders immune from adult prosecution. Through waiver mech-
anisms, most states provide for the prosecution of certain juvenile offenders
in the criminal courtsY.7 Indeed, the advent of the juvenile court system and
the rehabilitative ideal has not ended juvenile death sentences or executions.7 9
The fact of juvenile death penalties would seem to indicate a different societal
attitude toward juveniles convicted of capital crimes.
The transfer of juvenile offenders to the criminal courts, however, does
not mean that the juvenile is an adult for sentencing purposes.80 The decision
to try a minor as an adult rarely involves a determination of the minor's
maturity or responsibility for his or her actions.8' In addition, waiver does
77.
The young are not only our future, they are our present, in a sense and to a
degree that cannot be said of those who have reached maturity and yet are still
in need of care and aid. All juveniles, not only delinquents, are 'persons in need
of supervision,' to use the now terrible and damning phrase that has become part
of the juvenile justice system. When they become what society cannot or will not
tolerate, it seems clear on the face of it that supervision must somewhere have
broken down, which means, in short, that we, the elders, have failed. Not only
as parents, as teachers, as police officers, but as a community and as a society.
Sagarin, Foreward, in D. SHOEMAKER, THEORIsS OF DELINQUENCY: AN EXAMINATION OF Ex-
PLANATIONS OF DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR ix (1984); see also supra note 6 (goal of juvenile justice
system is to rehabilitate, not to punish).
78. See supra note 5.
79. See Streib, supra note 67, at 619 (192 executions for crimes committed by persons under
the age of 18 since 1900); see also supra note 68.
80. Hill, supra note 57, at 32.
81. Under legislative waiver, minors are transferred to the criminal courts solely on the
basis of their crime. Except for a statutory minimum age below which minors cannot be
transferred, maturity does not enter into the waiver decision at all. See supra note 5. Legislative
waiver statutes are often severely criticized for being inconsistent with the rehabilitative phi-
losophy of the juvenile system, because they focus entirely on the offense rather than the
individual characteristics of the offender. See, e.g., Feld, Legislative Policies, supra note 5, at
508-09 (many youths who could benefit from rehabilitation and who pose no future threat to
society are tried and punished as adults due to legislative waiver).
Under judicial waiver, a court typically considers the following factors in making its waiver
decision: (1) the youth's age; (2) the youth's dangerousness to society; (3) seriousness of the
offense; (4) past criminal activity; (5) the youth's treatment prognosis. Note, Juvenile Offenders
and the Electric Chair: Cruel and Unusual Punishment or Firm Discipline for the Hopelessly
Delinquent?, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 344, 349 (1983). Although age is one of the factors considered
by courts, a determination of the minor's maturity is rarely part of the judicial waiver decision.
Most judicial waiver statutes do not require that the minor's maturity be considered. See, e.g.,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(3)(a) (West 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.45 (6)-(7) (West Supp.
1985). One commentator has argued that age plays a role in the waiver decision process only
because minors may be retained in the juvenile justice system until they reach the statutory
maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1478-79. Since
minors in the juvenile system must be released from custody upon reaching the maximum age,
the juvenile court must consider whether the period of time left to treat the youth in the
juvenile system is sufficient for rehabilitation, or whether the juvenile's release upon achieving
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not suggest that society can disclaim responsibility for serious youth crimes,
the sorts of crime that most typically result in waiver. 2 Thus, the societal
attitudes toward juvenile offenders reflected in the ideals of the juvenile
justice system are not necessarily overturned when juveniles are tried in adult
courts.
Jury verdicts are also uncertain indicators of society's acceptance of the
juvenile death penalty.83 Clearly, some juries have been willing to sentence
minors to death, since minors currently await execution in our prisons.8
The number of death row inmates who committed their crimes while under
eighteen is only a small fraction of the total number of inmates awaiting
death, 5 however, indicating reluctance on the part of juries to sentence
juveniles to death.8 6 Consistent refusal by juries to impose a punishment is
the maximum age would pose a threat to society. "If the time is too short for proper reha-
bilitation or the resources too inadequate to treat the minor within the period of time available,
the. . .juvenile is transferred to criminal court, where he can receive a sentence that would
keep him in custody beyond his eighteenth birthday." Id.
Even if age could operate as a surrogate for maturity, it could easily be outweighed by
other factors in the waiver decision process. Appellate courts and state legislatures typically
refrain from giving any one factor controlling weight, leaving judges with wide discretion to
determine which youths shall be transferred into the criminal system. See Note, supra, at 351
& n.48. Often, the judge's personal belief regarding the propriety of criminal punishment, or
political pressure on the state judiciary to "get tough" with juvenile criminals, has a decisive
effect on the waiver decision, to the exclusion of any consideration of the youth's maturity,
age or culpability. See id. at 351 & n.49; see also Comment, supra note 5, at 1478 (minors
are typically transferred to criminal court because they are not suitable candidates for treatment
or because a disposition within the juvenile system would prove a threat to society).
In some states, the court is required to assess the juvenile's maturity. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§ 12-15-34(d)(4)-(5) (1975); FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2)(c)(6) (1981). Maturity is still only one of the
numerous factors the court considers in making the waiver decision. The court need not find
the minor mature in order to transfer him, and a finding of maturity is rarely the decisive
factor in the transfer decision. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1500.
82. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1495-96 (tracing violent yotith crime to failure of families,
schools and social systems to provide proper support and guidance); see also Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (recognizing that a turbulent family history and beatings by a
harsh father are relevant mitigating factors in sentencing a youthful capital offender).
83. The Supreme Court has stated that capital case juries play a crucial role in determining
contemporary standards of decency. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15
(1968). The Court's reliance on jury verdicts has not been without criticism, however. See,
e.g., Goodpaster, Judicial Review of Death Sentences, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 786,
798 (1983) (a single jury may not accurately reflect dominant community or state-wide senti-
ment).
84. See Brief for Petitioner at 19a (App. E), Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982);
Reinhold, supra note 68.
85. See Reinhold, supra note 68 (as of August 1, 1985, youthful offenders constituted only
two percent of the total number of inmates on death row).
86. See, e.g., Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387, 422-23, 478 A.2d 1143, 1161 (1984) (that only
17 out of 800 death row inmates were under 18, fewer than expected given the number of
homicides committed by juveniles, showed "some reluctance on the part of juries to sentence
juveniles to death"); Hill, supra note 57, at 9 & n.23 (number of juveniles awaiting execution
is small given number of homicides committed by juveniles, suggesting societal attitudes are
rejecting juvenile death penalty). Many commentators have observed that juveniles typically do
not receive the maximum allowable penalty for their crimes, even their homicides, despite the
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an indication of society's distaste for that punishment.8 7
It is also instructive to examine the ways in which state courts have treated
jury verdicts on appeal.88 Though no clear pattern is discernible, many state
courts have refused to uphold a death sentence imposed on a minor.8 9 For
this reason, and due to the relative infrequency of death sentences for minors,
jury verdicts do not indicate that society favors the juvenile death penalty.
International opinion seems to weigh against the juvenile death penalty.
One study found that out of 101 countries setting a minimum age for capital
punishment, seventeen set the minimum age at eighteen and seventy-seven
set it at twenty.90
The most telling evidence that societal attitudes favor a juvenile death
penalty would seem to be the legislative enactments of the states. Out of
thirty-five capital punishment states, twenty-nine permit the execution of at
least some minors. 91 This represents a majority of all states, and more than
three-fourths of capital punishment states. In all states, however, youth is
a mitigating factor that can be offered by the defendant to secure leniency
public's growing "get tough" attitude toward juvenile crime in general. The reason assigned
for this phenomenon is reluctance on the part of sentencers to put minors to death. See, e.g.,
W. HEAPS, JUVrENsI JUSTICE 11 (1974) ("the usual sentence for minors found guilty of
homicide... is life imprisonment, without parole, because of their ages"); Hill, supra note 57,
at 17; Jolly & Sagarin, The First Eight After Furman: Who Was Executed With the Return
of the Death Penalty?, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 610, 618 (1984) (predicting that reluctance of juries
to impose the death penalty on juveniles will continue).
87. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 300 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Hill, supra
note 57, at 17.
88. Though the sentencing decisions of juries are an established ingredient of a standards
of decency analysis, see supra note 63 and accompanying text, jury sentencing in capital cases
has been severely criticized as unfair and liable to racial prejudice. See, e.g., S. RuBIN, LAW
OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 94 (2d ed. Supp. 1981). At least one Supreme Court justice is skeptical
about the reliability of jury verdicts as indicators of societal standards. Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782, 816-18 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). That jury verdicts can be unreliable indicators
of constitutional values is shown by the frequent reversal of death sentences. See infra note
89 and accompanying text.
89. Death sentences for minors have been upheld on appeal in Trimble, 300 Md. 387, 478
A.2d 1143; Leatherwood v. State, 435 So. 2d 645 (Miss. 1983); Tokman v. State, 435 So. 2d
664 (Miss. 1983); State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487 (Mo. banc 1983); High v. State, 247 Ga.
289, 276 S.E.2d 5 (1981); State v. Prejean, 379 So. 2d 240 (La. 1979); State v. Shaw, 273 S.C.
194, 255 S.E.2d 799 (1979). Cases overturning a death sentence include State v. Valencia, 132
Ariz. 248, 645 P.2d 239 (1982); State v. Maloney, 105 Ariz. 348, 464 P.2d 793 (1970); State
v. Stewart, 197 Neb. 497, 250 N.W.2d 849 (1977); State v. Hall, 176 Neb. 295, 125 N.W.2d
918 (1964); Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959).
90. Sixteen countries did not have a minimum age or did not provide adequate information.
See Patrick, The Status of Capital Punishment: A World Perspective, 56 J. CRIM. L. CRrMI-
NOLOGY & POL. Sd. 397, 398-404, 410 (1965); see also International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) ("a sentence
of death will not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age").
91. Reinhold, supra note 68. The remaining six death penalty states forbid execution for a
crime committed by someone under 18, while several states set the statutory minimum age at
17 or 16. See supra note 7.
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in sentencing.9" Many states have designated the offender's youth as a miti-
gating factor by statute.93 Thus, some legislative concern about the execution
of minors exists even in states that authorize it. Moreover, combining the
fifteen non-capital punishment states with the six capital punishment states
that forbid the juvenile death penalty yields twenty-one states that forbid
the execution of minors, a substantial minority. Thus, no clear consensus
in favor of the juvenile death penalty exists among state legislatures. 94 Finally,
although the Supreme Court is willing to afford great weight to legislative
judgments as indicators of contemporary standards, 9 it is also willing to
override those judgments when necessary to protect individual rights.96 What-
ever force legislative judgments in favor of the juvenile death penalty carry
can therefore be overridden by appropriate eighth amendment arguments.
The above discussion makes clear that traditional objective indicators of
society's evolving standards of decency give at best an ambiguous picture
of the acceptability of the juvenile death penalty. This ambiguity alone argues
against capital punishment for minors, since certainty as to the validity of
a punishment is required under the eighth amendment. 97
This Note proposes, as an alternative indicator of standards of decency,
a review of judicial and legislative attitudes toward minors in general, at-
92. Sentencers are required to consider the defendant's youth, if proffered in mitigation,
by decisions of the Supreme Court. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978) (holding that sentencing authority must consider any and all aspects of defendant's
character offered in mitigation, including youth).
93. In 24 states, an offender's youth is designated as a mitigating factor by statute. Brief
for Petitioner at 46-47, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); see also Special Project,
Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of Fairness and Consistency, 69 CoRNELL
L. REv. 1129, 1233 (1984) (listing states which explicitly make age at time of crime relevant
to sentencing decision).
94. One commentator argues that because states are divided on the death penalty issue, no
national moral consensus for or against the death penalty exists. Either the definition of cruelty
differs from state to state, or there is a consistent moral standard on the issue having an
external source, to which some states fail to adhere. Rather than citing state court decisions
and state laws that support the death penalty, decisions and laws which represent the views of
only a part of the country, the Supreme Court should decide what the national moral standard
is to be. See Radin, supra note 28, at 1038-39; Radin, supra note 57, at 1158-59. Another
commentator has argued that, in states that permit the juvenile death penalty, lack of legislative
prohibition cannot be equated with legislative approval. Often, a state legislature does not act
upon a problem until specific action is required. Since death penalties for juveniles-are rare,
the need for a specific prohibition of the juvenile death penalty may not have been perceived
in the states that allow it. See Hill, supra note 57, at 16. But see Trimble, 300 Md. at 387,
478 A.2d at 1143 (concluding society has not rejected juvenile death penalty from fact 20 states
permit it).
95. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174 (1976).
96. "Although legislative measures ddopted by the people's chosen representatives provide
one important means of ascertaining contemporary values, it is evident that legislative judgments
alone cannot be determinative of Eighth Amendment standards since that Amendment was
intended to safeguard individuals from the abuse of legislative power." Id. at 174 n. 19 (citations
omitted).
97. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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titudes rooted in the belief that minors are inherently less mature and re-
sponsible than adults.98
B. Judicial and Legislative Attitudes Toward Minors
The Supreme Court, in Eddings v. Oklahoma,99 discussed the importance
of youth as a mitigating factor in sentencing for capital crimes.
[Yiouth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of
life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psycho-
logical damage. Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition
that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature
and responsible than adults.' °°
Thus, the Court recognized the relevance of non-criminal laws dealing with
the maturity and judgment of minors to capital sentencing decisions for
minors.'0'
A brief overview of the protections afforded to, and limitations placed
upon, minors by courts and legislatures will illustrate the general view in
the law that minors are inherently less mature and responsible than adults. 0 2
This societal attitude is consistent with the rehabilitative philosophy of the
juvenile court system, but is at odds with the punitive philosophies inherent
in capital punishment. 0 3 Our contemporary standards of decency include a
protective and nurturing attitude toward minors, due to their inherent im-
maturity. Subjecting minors to the ultimate punishment for their crimes
would violate that protective attitude.1' 4
98. See infra notes 100-35 and accompanying text.
99. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
100. Id. at 115-16.
101. Quoting from Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979), the Court pointed out that
"during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment expected of adults." Ed(dings, 455 U.S. at 116. Bellotti concerned
the rights of minors to secure abortions.
102. This Note will not attempt to catalogue the differences from state to state in laws
concerning the welfare and legal incapacity of minors. Nor will it attempt to explore the various
ages at which persons are considered adults for the purposes of driving, contracting, working,
etc. Rather, this Note will attempt to present some generally held doctrines in the law which
are based on the assumption that children are inherently less mature than adults. For a more
detailed analysis of specific laws and interstate variations, see A. SussMAN, THE RIGHTS OF
You~o PEOPLE (1977).
103. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
104. "If anything, prohibiting the death penalty for juveniles would be consistent with the
actions of state governments around the country in protecting juvenile welfare and promoting
juvenile guidance." Comment, Eddings v. Oklahoma: A Stay of Execution for Juveniles?, 9
NEw ENG. J. CRii.. & Crv. CONFINEMENT 407, 423 (1983).
Morover, given the presumption that minors are less responsible than adults, the juvenile
death penalty would seem to violate the constitutional requirement that the recipient of capital




The law has long recognized that minors have "a very special place in
life which law should reflect." 1°5 The law contains many age-based distinc-
tions between minors and adults, limiting minors' freedoms and powers of
self-determination, premised upon their presumed immaturity and need for
special protection."1 6
The Supreme Court has recognized that certain restrictions upon minors
are necessary to protect them from the consequences of their own decisions.
Chief Justice Burger has written that "most children, even in adolescence,
simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions....
Parents can and must make those judgments."'' 7
Traditionally, the law has recognized the rights of parents to speak for
their minor children and to exercise authority over them.'08 Laws designed
to support the parental role in child-rearing further a state interest in the
proper upbringing and support of children.'09 Two common restrictions
designed both to promote parental authority and to protect minors from the
consequences of their own decisions are the requirements of parental consent
for marriage and for obtaining a driver's license.
The age at which marriage can be contracted without parental notification
or consent is at least eighteen in all states." 0 The minimum age at which
105. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
106. See generally A. SussMAN, supra note 97; Hafen, Children's Liberation & the New
Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights, " 1976 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 605; Wald, Children's Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 255
(1979).
107. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979); see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678, 693 n.15 (1977) ("the law has generally regarded minors as having a lesser capability
for making important decisions"); Batey, The Rights of Adolescents, 23 Wm. & MARY L. REv.
363, 369 (1982) ("The traditional view of the law... reflected in Chief Justice Burger's comment
in Parham v. J.R., is that a person does not acquire the skills of moral choice until the end
of adolescence."). Parham involved the constitutionality under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment of Georgia procedures for the parental commitment of children under
the age of 18 to state mental hospitals.
108.
Our jurisprudence historically has reflected western civilization concepts of the
family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children .... The law's
concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child
lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgments required for making
life's difficult decisions.
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 602.
109. See Comment, The Constitution & The Family, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1156 (1980).
110. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES, THE LEGAL STATUS OF ADOLESCENTS
1980, at 43-47 (1981) [hereinafter THE LEGAL STATUS OF ADOLESCENTS]. In Mississippi, Nebraska,
and Wyoming, the minimum age requirements for marriage without parental consent are 17,
19 and 19 respectively. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-1-5d (Supp. 1985); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-105
(1981); Wyo. STAT. § 20-1-102(c) (1977). In Mississippi, parental notification is required until
the parties are 21. MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-1-5(b) (Supp. 1985). Most states set an age below
which marriage is entirely prohibited. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-102 (1984) (17 years
old). Other states declare that marriage below a certain age is void and prohibited, unless a
judge of competent jurisdiction approves the marriage. E.g., N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 15(3)
(McKinney Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. § 20-1-102(b) (1977) (16 years old).
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marriage can be contracted with parental consent varies from fourteen to
sixteen years of age."' The right of a state to regulate the age at which a
minor may marry has withstood constitutional attack, on the grounds that
such regulation is justified by the state's interest in preventing unstable
marriages among those lacking the capacity to act in their own best inter-
ests."12
The requirements and conditions for a minor to obtain a driver's license
vary greatly from state to state. The most common requirement is the consent
of a parent or guardian."i 3 Other restrictions commonly applied only to
young applicants are the completion of a driver education course," 4 or the
limitation of driving to specified purposes, such as attending school, unless
accompanied by an adult licensed driver." 5 The purpose of such limitations
is to base the extent of the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the fitness
of the operator."1
6
Minors are subject to many other restrictions that do not apply to adults,
arising from their presumed lack of mature judgment. For example, many
jurisdictions have curfew statutes or ordinances, designed to reinforce pa-
rental authority and to protect young people from harm in situations likely
to encourage delinquent actions." 7 Most states specify a minimum age below
which minors may not enter a pool hall."' Minors are typically prohibited
111. See TIE LEGAL STATUS OF ADOLEsCENTS, supra note 105, at 43-47; see, e.g., N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 15(2) (McKinney Supp. 1986) (16 years old).
112. See Moe v. Dinkins, 669 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1982) (upholding New York law requiring
that all male applicants for marriage license between 16 and 18, and all female applicants
between 14 and 18, obtain consent of parents).
113. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 12650(b) (West Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.09(l)(a)
(West Supp. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1507(a) (Purdon 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-
7-104(8)(c) (1980).
114. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 12507 (1971 & West Supp. 1986); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF.
LAW § 502(2) (McKinney Supp. 1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75 § 1503(b)(1) (Purdon 1977).
115. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 12513(a) (West Supp. 1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §
1503(c)(2) (Purdon 1977); see also People v. Joy, 50 Misc. 2d 690, 271 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1966)
(purpose of junior license would normally be to permit a young persoA to run errands for his
parents, to drive to the beach on a summer day and to drive to school or to work).
116. See, e.g., State v. Balmotritis, 5 Conn. Cir. 72, 242 A.2d 99 (1967) (license to operate
motor vehicle is purely a personal privilege issued by state on account of fitness).
117. See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1256-57 (M.D. Pa.
1975), aff'd mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976) (upholding
juvenile curfew ordinance affecting minors under 18 on basis of state's right to protect children
from their own immaturity and vulnerability); In re C., 28 Cal. App. 3d 747, 105 Cal. Rptr.
113 (1977); City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 7 Ohio App. 2d 212, 220 N.E.2d 126 (1966). See
generally Note, Assessing the Scope of Minors' Fundamental Rights: Juvenile Curfews and the
Constitution, 97 HAgv. L. Rav. 1163 (1984); Comment, Juvenile Curfew Ordinances and the
Constitution, 76 MICH. L. REv. 109 (1977).
118. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 84-1611 (1979) (18 years of age); MAss. ANN. LAws ch.
140, § 179 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981) (18 years of age); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 465(3)




from buying cigarettes" 9 or alcohol. 20 States or municipalities may forbid
the mere presence of minors in an establishment where alcohol is sold.
121
The freedoms of minors are often restricted in the name of ensuring their
proper moral development. For example, a vast majority of states control
the sale of pornographic material to minors by regulating the exhibition and
distribution of such material. 22 The Supreme Court has upheld the consti-
tutionality of a law prohibiting the sale to minors of material classified as
obscene based on its appeal to minors, although it would not be considered
obscene for adults. 23 The law was justified by the state's interest in protecting
children from abuses which might prevent their growth into free and well-
developed persons. 24 The Court has recognized that children may be pre-
vented from enjoying full first amendment freedoms in the name of ensuring
their proper growth and development. 25 In general, the Court has recognized,
in cases involving legislation restricting or prohibiting the sale or distribution
119. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 308(a) (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.685
(West Supp. 1985). The minimum age is usually the age of majority, though some states set
it at 15 or 16. See THE LEGAL STATUS OF ADOLESCENTS, supra note 110, at 117-18.
120. The sale of alcohol to persons below a certain age is restricted in every state, with the
minimum age varying from 18 to 21. See F. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF
ADOLESCENTS 3-6 (1982). A key provision of the Highway Safety Amendments Act, Pub. L.
No. 98-363, 98 Stat. 435 (1984) (codified at 23 U.S.C.A. § 158 (West Supp. 1984)), mandates
that all states receiving federal highway funds raise their minimum legal age for the purchase
of alcoholic beverages to 21. Any state that does not comply will lose five percent of the
highway funds allocated to that state, beginning in October, 1986. Ten percent of allocated
federal highway funds will be withheld in 1987, if the state still has not raised the minimum
age.
121. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 562.48 (West Supp. 1985); MIcH. Corn,. LAws ANN.
§ 750.141 (West Supp. 1985); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.20(1) (McKinney 1967).
122. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 419(a)(1) (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 573.040(l)
(Vernon 1979). See generally THE LEGAL STATUS OF ADOLESCENTS, supra note 110, at 269-71.
123. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
124. Id. at 642; see also M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1983) (upholding
ordinance prohibiting sale of material to minors that was not obscene for adults, because such
material would be harmful to minors); State v. Siegel, 139 N.J. Super. 373, 354 A.2d 103
(1975) (because of strong and abiding interest in its youth, state has authority to protect youth
from objectionable material and to establish two standards of obscenity); Calderon v. Buffalo,
61 App. Div. 2d 323, 402 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1978) (interest in healthy emotional development of
young persons permits state to intervene in support of parental role by preventing adverse
effect on young minds of sexually explicit material with respect to which they lack mature
judgment).
125. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. at 649-50 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("a child is not
possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of first amend-
ment guarantees"); see also Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 939 (1963):
The world of children is not strictly part of the adult realm of free expression.
The factor of immaturity, and perhaps other considerations, impose different
rules. Without attempting here to formulate the principles relevant to freedom of
expression for children, it suffices to say that regulation of communication ad-
dressed to them need not conform to the requirements of the first amendment in
the same way as those applicable to adults.
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to minors of specified goods or services otherwise available to adults, that
the state has greater power to control the conduct of children.'2 6
The special place of minors in the law will be illustrated through three
final examples: the rights of minors to contract, to hold property and to file
a lawsuit.
Although minors are not prohibited from executing contracts, the basic
rule is that all contracts by minors are voidable, allowing minors to disaffirm
their contracts, executive or executory, during their minority or within a
reasonable time after emancipation.'27 The purpose of this rule is to protect
minors "from foolishly squandering their wealth through improvident con-
tracts with crafty adults who could take advantage of them in the market-
126. See Hafen, supra note 106. Some recent Supreme Court opinions have expanded the
rights of minors to make their own choices, most notably in the area of a minor female's right
to obtain an abortion without parental consent. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (independent parental interest in abortion decision
was outweighed by privacy interest of minor old enough to become pregnant). Some commen-
tators have seen in such opinions a general recognition of adult decision-making capacity for
minors, and have called for an end to age-based restrictions. See, e.g., Batey, supra note 107.
The Court, however, has consistently held to the basic principle that minors generally need
special guidance and care. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 643 n.23 ("the fact that a
minor may be very much an adult in some respects does not mean that his or her need and
opportunity for growth under parental guidance and discipline have ended"). The Court's
decisions tend to be carefully limited to the circumstances presented, and are not sweeping
condemnations of age-based restrictions in the law. See id. ("the peculiar nature of the abortion
decision requires the opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of the maturity of pregnant
minors"). The limited expansions of minors' rights and decision-making powers are motivated
by the same desire to protect young people that underlies age-based restrictions. For example,
in Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1978), the Court struck down a state statute
prohibiting the sale or distribution of contraceptives to minors under the age of 16. One
commentator has called this case an effort to "avoid harming kids in the name of helping
them"-i.e., although the state might rationally decide that sexual intercourse between minors
should be abolished, such a law would be unenforceable, so that limiting access to contraception
in the name of youth welfare would actually be cruel. F. ZIMRNG, supra note 120, at 62-63.
The argument that adolescent maturity should be equated with that of adults has been based
on Supreme Court cases granting procedural due process rights to minors. See In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967) (addressing legal procedures constitutionally required in delinquency hearings);
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (due process clause requires notice of charges and a hearing
as precondition to suspension from public school). See generally F. ZIMRING, supra note 120,
at 77-87; Wald, supra note 106. A careful reading of the decisions indicates that, in considering
the constitutional dimensions of procedures concerning minors, the Court has not abandoned
traditional assumptions about the competence of minors to exercise adult rights. See Hafen,
supra note 106, at 641. As one commentator has argued: "[the capacity of children has nothing
to do with their right to be treated fairly, decently and humanely by the government. They
are entitled to such treatment not because they are competent but because they are persons."
Letwin, After Goss v. Lopez: Student Status as Suspect Classification?, 29 STAN. L. REv. 627,
642 (1977); see also G. MELTON, CHILD ADVOCACY: PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES AND INTERVENTIONS
2-4 (1983) (movement to secure basic human rights for children is not an attempt to secure
adult treatment for children). Thus, the Court has not changed its views about the maturity
and capacity of minors simply because it has granted certain procedural rights to minors and
has expanded their decision-making powers in limited contexts for their own welfare.
127. WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 239 (3d ed. 1939); see also In re Bierman, 271 F. Supp.
774 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981).
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place.' '1 2 Courts have generally agreed that upon disaffirmance, the minor
is responsible only to the extent that he or she still possesses the consideration
for the contract, regardless of its condition, since any other rule would
violate the goal of protecting minors from their own indiscretion and im-
maturity. 129
In the realm of property law, minors have the right to acquire and own
property, but the law presumes they are incapable of property management.
Guardians have traditionally been appointed by courts to manage the prop-
erty.130 The minor is presumed to be incompetent, and is therefore in need
of a guardian to manage the property for the minor's benefit. 3'
Minors cannot initiate or defend against lawsuits without adult assist-
ance. 3 2 Rules of procedure identify the child's representative, or provide for
the appointment of a guardian ad litem or next friend. 33 The fundamental
purpose of this requirement is the protection of the minor's best in-
terests. 13
This brief overview, while not exhaustive, illustrates that minors do, in-
deed, enjoy a "very special place" in the law. The various limitations placed
upon minors for their own protection and guidance indicate a societal attitude
at odds with the retributive and punitive philosophies behind the death
penalty. The execution of minors suggests an abrogation of society's obli-
gation to protect children. 135 In the next section, the Note demonstrates that
society's obligation to protect children is owed even to juveniles accused of
a capital crime.
128. WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 234 (3d ed. 1939). Many statutory exceptions to this rule
exist, but the "lack [of] any coherent pattern or philosophy" across the states makes it impossible
to speculate as to why the exceptions exist. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOmesTc RELATIONS 236 (1968).
See generally 42 AM. JUR. 2D Infants (1969).
129. See, e.g., Nelson v. Browning, 391 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. 1965); Hamrick v. Hospital Serv.
Corp., 110 R.I. 634, 296 A.2d 15 (1972); Halbman v. Lemke, 99 Wis. 2d 241, 298 N.W.2d
562 (1980); see also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 62 comment b (1937).
130. See, e.g., Baker v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 651 (M.D.N.C. 1955); Bach v. Long
Island Jewish Hosp., 49 Misc. 2d 207, 267 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
131. See Baker v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 651 (M.D.N.C. 1955). See generally 39 C.J.S.
Guardian and Ward § 3 (1976).
132. See generally 42 AM. JuR. 2D Infants §§ 155-58 (1969).
133. See FED. R. Cir. P. 17(c). Most states model their applicable rule on the Federal Rule.
See, e.g., MAss. R. Civ. P. 17(b); D.C. CT. R. 17(c). Under such rules, the court is required
to consider the necessity of appointing a guardian ad litem, and to either appoint one, or to
make a finding that the minor's best interests can be protected without one. See Noe v. True,
507 F.2d 9' 11-12 (6th Cir. 1974).
134. See Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1958).
135. See, e.g., Streib, supra note 67, at 637 ("The spectacle of our society seeking legal
vengeance through execution of a child raises fundamental questions about the nature of
children's moral responsibility for their actions and about society's moral responsibility to
protect and nurture children.").
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C. Standards of Decency and the Juvenile Murderer
This Note has not yet considered whether the commission of a capital
crime works a change in society's standards of decency regarding the care
and protection of a juvenile. Some commentators have argued that the
juvenile murderer forfeits the special place in life he enjoyed before his
crime, so that society's benign attitude toward minors in general does not
extend far enough to embrace him. 36 Society appears to be developing a
"get tough" attitude toward juvenile offenders generally;' 37 perhaps society
cannot satisfy its moral outrage at serious juvenile crime except by treating
juvenile criminals more harshly. 3 3
Society's evolving standards of decency, however, have not embraced the
idea of a juvenile death penalty. Despite the development of a "get tough"
attitude, the objective indicators upon which the Supreme Court traditionally
relies to gauge societal support for a punishment are ambivalent on the
question of the juvenile death penalty. 39
Moreover, society experiences less moral outrage at a murder committed
by a juvenile than at a murder committed by an adult.14' Since society
generally regards minors as less responsible individuals, who are worthy of
special protection,' 4' one would expect society to be angered less by a ju-
venile's offense than by an adult's.' 42 In fact, strong evidence exists which
indicates that juries and some courts are reluctant to impose capital pun-
ishment on convicted juvenile murderers.' 43
Although capital sentencing, of minors involves the transfer of juveniles
to the adult system,' 44 nothing indicates that society ceases to hold its pre-
sumptions about youthful immaturity toward minors tried in the criminal
courts. Transferred minors are still subject to all the laws which society has
136. See, e.g., Note, supra note 3.
137. See, e.g., P. SRaBRmo, VIOLENT DELINQUENTS (1978); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE, supra note 76.
138. Retribution is a permissible penological goal for punishments, and satisfies society's
need to express moral outrage at crime. See text accompanying notes 39-42.
139. See supra notes 67-99 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Jolly & Sagarin, supra note 86, at 612 (teenagers convicted of murder are
likely to arouse sympathy of public, even as public sympathy for murderers facing death penalty
generally wanes); see also id. at 618 (predicts that there is little likelihood of youths in their
late teens receiving death penalty in large numbers, due to societal distaste for putting youths
to death).
141. See supra notes 100-35 and accompanying text.
142. See Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 39, at 388 (a person who is less culpable for a crime
is likely to invoke less moral outrage than the person who is more culpable for a crime). That
minors are always less responsible for their crimes is discussed infra notes 169-81 and accom-
panying text.
143. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 4-5.
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enacted to protect them from their own inability to understand the conse-
quences of their acts.' 45 In addition, sentencers recognize youth as a mitigating
factor of great weight,' 46 particularly in capital cases,' 47 because courts pre-
sume that youth evidences a lack of maturity and an inability to control
one's actions.' 4
The decision to transfer a minor to criminal court typically does not
involve a determination that the minor is as mature as an adult. Under
legislative waiver, the transfer decision is based solely on the offender's age
and crime, while under judicial waiver courts will transfer minors found to
be unsuitable candidates for treatment or because disposition within the
juvenile system would pose a threat to society. 49 In short, the decision to
try a juvenile offender as an adult has no bearing on societal attitudes about
the maturity of minors and their need for care. '" 0 Since society's evolving
standards of decency have not embraced a juvenile death penalty but continue
to show a protective attitude toward juvenile offenders, juvenile crime clearly
does not serve to remove minors from that special place in life which is
reflected in our laws.
D. Summary
The foregoing presentation reveals that society's evolving standards of
decency do not support a juvenile death penalty.15 ' Society assumes that
minors are immature and unable to appreciate the consequences of their
145. See Comment, supra note 99, at 433.
146. See, e.g., People v. Goss, 10 11. App. 3d 543, 294 N.E.2d 744 (1973) (sentence of 50-
100 years for robbery and murder reduced to 25-100 years because defendant was 18 years
old); People v. Adams, 8 Ill. App. 3d 8, 288 N.E.2d 724 (1972) (75-100 year sentence for
felony murder reduced to 40-100 years because defendant was only 18); State v. Kiser, 194
Neb. 513, 233 N.W.2d 571 (1975) ("Ordinarily a defendant's youth indicates that a sentence
should be something less than the statutory maximum.").
147. See cases cited supra note 89.
148. See, e.g., State v. Maloney, 105 Ariz. 348, 360, 464 P.2d 793, 805, cert. denied, 400
U.S. 841 (1970) ("The defendant has committed a heinous crime, the sheer brutality of which
unquestionably shocked the jury .... Because of his immaturity we are persuaded that he
should not die.").
149. See supra notes 4 & 78; see also Comment, supra note 4, at 1500 nn.166-67 (court
determination that minor is mature is rarely made as part of waiver decision).
150. One commentator has written:
The traditional distinction between "treatment" as a juvenile and "punishment"
as an adult is based on an arbitrarily drawn line that has no criminological
significance other than its legal consequences. The inconsistencies between the
juvenile and the adult systems often make futile any attempt to rationalize social
control and the response to serious youthful deviance. These inconsistencies arise
from the legislature's failure to recognize that children are constantly maturing;
they are not irresponsible children one day and responsible adults the next, except
as a matter of law.
Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform, supra note 2, at 230-31 (footnote omitted).
151. See supra notes 67-98 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 61:757
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR MINORS
actions, and therefore restricts their rights and freedoms in many ways.15 2
The societal attitudes reflected in these restrictions are not changed when
minors commit serious crimes; even juvenile murderers do not forfeit that
special place in society that all juveniles enjoy.'53 Thus, society's view that
all minors should enjoy special protection and care cannot be reconciled
with the retributive and punitive philosophies behind the death penalty. The
execution of persons for crimes committed while minors therefore violates
contemporary standards of decency regarding juveniles.
Society's standards, reflected in the presumption that minors are less
responsible for their actions than adults, are also relevant to an analysis of
the juvenile death penalty under the dignity of man principle of the eighth
amendment.'5 4 This principle focuses primarily on the personal responsibiity
and maturity of the offender. 5  Society's assumptions about the irrespon-
sibility of minors are corroborated by criminological assumptions regarding
the reduced responsibility of minors for their crimes, leading to the conclusion
that the death penalty always violates the dignity of man principle when
applied to a minor.
III. THE DIGNITY OF MAN AND THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
A punishment violates the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause if it is excessive.'5 6 A punishment is excessive if it is dispro-
portionate to the offense or if it fails to make a measurable contribution
to the penological goals of retribution and the deterrence of prospective
offenders.'5 7 The death penalty per se has passed both tests.,
Each instance of capital punishment, however, must be examined for
disproportionality and for its contribution to the goals of retribution and
deterrence. Currently, the sentencing authority must consider youth as a
mitigating factor, if proffered by the defendant.'59 As a mitigating factor,
youth could weigh against imposition of the death penalty on the grounds
that death is a disproportionate punishment for a youthful offender or that
valid penological goals would not be served by executing a youthful offender.
Some minors would still be executed, however, since sentencers are free to
impose the death penalty in spite of mitigating factors profferred by the
defendant.1'6 The following sections will demonstrate that the death penalty
152. See supra notes 99-135 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 136-50 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 37-52 and accompanying text.
158. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176-87 (1976).
159. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
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is unconstitutional in all instances in which a juvenile has committed a
murder. Since the eighth amendment requires absolute certainty regarding
the validity of each death sentence, even a substantial doubt regarding the
legitimacy of the death penalty in a particular case is enough to render the
punishment unconstitutional.' 6' If the requisite certainty is lacking whenever
a juvenile is convicted of a capital crime, than a death penalty for minors
must be per se unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court's disproportionality analysis requires that in every
capital case, courts examine not only the magnitude of the harm, but also
the personal responsibility of the offender for the harm. 62 The punishment
must be proportionate in light of "relevant facets of the character and record
of the individual offender," which indicate whether the person to be put to
death is as culpable as others receiving a similar punishment for having
caused a similar harm. 63 Thus, if minors who kill are always less responsibile
than their adult counterparts, then minors must never be subjected to the
maximum penalty to which adults are subject for the same crime.
The personal characteristics of each defendant are also examined in de-
termining whether each instance of capital punishment promotes valid pen-
ological goals. 16 The retributive goal of the death penalty is to assuage
society's moral outrage at criminal acts and desire that offenders be given
the punishments they deserve. 65 If society feels less moral outrage when a
juvenile kills, and juveniles always deserve less than adult punishment due
to a lower level of culpability for their crimes, then the juvenile death penalty
will never further the retributive purpose of captial punishment.
The death penalty serves the deterrence goal if an execution will send a
message to potential offenders contemplating a similar act that they might
suffer a similar fate.1'6 If some inherent characteristics of youth would
prevent this message from being sent or received, the juvenile death penalty
will fail to serve the deterrence goal in all instances.
In the following sections, the Note will demonstrate that the juvenile death
penalty is disproportionate and fails to promote valid penological goals in
every case, due to the immaturity of juveniles. Society's conclusive pre-
sumptions regarding juvenile incapacity, reflected in legislative and judicial
attitudes toward minors, apply to all minors, even those convicted of violent
crimes. Thus, the inherent irresponsibility and immaturity of juveniles sug-
gests a reduced degree of culpability for their crimes. Criminological evidence
161. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
163. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 208, 304 (1976)). See supra note 40.
164. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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provides direct support for the proposition that juveniles are never as culpable
as adult criminals, tending to show that juveniles are not fully responsible
for their crimes. Although no singre factor can be identified as the cause of
juvenile crime, 67 enough causal factors beyond the control of the individual
have been identified to raise at least a presumption that the juvenile criminal
is less responsible than his or her adult counterpart.' 68 Coupled with society's
presumptions regarding juvenile crime, the criminological evidence is suffi-
cient to raise at least a substantial doubt that death is an appropriate penalty
for the juvenile murderer, which falls to satisfy the very high standards of
reliability which apply to capital sentencing.
A. Disproportionality and the Responsibility of Minors Who Kill
In general, society assumes that minors are less responsible than adults
due to their inherent immaturity. The Supreme Court has accepted the
premise that minors are less mature in their ability to make sound judgments
or to appreciate the consequences of their actions.' 69 That society has also
conclusively adopted this premise is illustrated by the many special laws
designed to protect minors from their own irresponsibility and inability to
make reasoned choices, laws which do not apply to adults.
70
These ideas carry over into the realm of juvenile criminology. The existence
of a separate juvenile justice system is based on the theory that minors are
less responsible than adults, and therefore deserve to be treated less harshly
than adult offenders.' 7' Even serious crimes by minors do not alter the
presumptions that minors are less responsible than adults and deserve less
punishment. 72
167. See, e.g., D. GIBBONS, DEINQUENT BEHAVIOR 96-100 (3d ed. 1981) (no single factor
causing juvenile delinquency exists in all cases, but a large set of factors has been identified
which interact in particular ways to produce delinquency).
168. See infra notes 161-99 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) ("Most children, even in adolescence,
simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions."); Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) ("during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors
often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could
be detrimental to them"); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("a child ... is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is
the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees") (citation omitted).
170. See supra notes 100-35 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 5; see also Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 5, at 515-
16; Paulsen, Kent v. U.S.: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv.
167, 169.
172. See TWENTIETH CENTuRy FuND TASK FORCE, supra note 76, at 7 ("Crimes committed
by youths may be just as harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they
deserve less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control their conduct
and to think in long-range terms than adults.") The principle of diminished responsibility has
been explicitly applied to the crime of murder. See, e.g., id. at 17 ("The principle of diminished
responsibility makes life imprisonment and death penalties inappropriate in such cases.")
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Youth is a turbulent phase of life during which one is more inclined to
participate in anti-social activities and criminal conduct. 7 3 Research indicates
that as people get older, their propensities to commit crime decrease, so that
by the time they reach their early twenties they commit fewer offenses. 74
But during the "crisis of adolescence,' 1 75 when minors, are thought to be
"most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage,' ' 76 minors are
exposed to many forces which encourage crime, including violent crime. The
Supreme Court has recognized, for example, that evidence of a "turbulent
family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe emotional
disturbance is particularly relevant" in determining the proper punishment
for a minor. 77 Youth crime is widely believed to be caused by a failure of
family, school and other social systems that share responsibility for the
proper development of minors.' 78 In other words, juvenile offenders are not
wholly responsible for their crimes.
The conclusion that minors are less responsible for their crimes than adults
is not changed by the fact that many juvenile offenders are tried in the
criminal courts. It has already been shown that the transfer of juveniles to
the adult courts does not involve a determination that minors are as mature
and responsible as adults. 79 Although the transfer of minors may be justified
by their dangerousness or non-amenability to treatment in the juvenile sys-
tem, 80 the fact that transfer does not mean a minor is mature enough to
control or understand his actions indicates that minors tried in criminal court
are still less responsible for their crimes than their adult counterparts.
Under the disproportionality analysis described above, which focuses on
the responsibility of the individual in relation to others facing the same
173. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE, supra note 76, at 3; Comment, supra
note 104, at 437.
174. See Zimring, American Youth Violence: Issues and Trends, in 1 CRIME AND JUSTICE:
AN ANNUAL REVrEw OF RESEARCH 67 (N. Morris & M. Tonry eds. 1979); Simpson, Rehabilitation
as the Justification of a Separate Juvenile Justice System, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 984, 1011-12
(1976); see also Feld, Legislative Policies, supra note 5, at 509-10 (youthful offenders likely to
desist from serious crime after one offense).
175. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948).
176. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982).
177. Id.
178. See supra notes 76 & 82 and accompanying text; see also Sorrells, What Can Be Done
About Juvenile Homicide? 26 CRnME & DELINQ. 152, 153-55 (1980) (concluding that minors
who kill come from violent and chaotic family backgrounds); Pink, Schools, Youth and Justice,
30 CR m & DELINQ. 439, 444 (1984) (schools contribute to delinquency by placing some students
in "low trajectory" programs, providing them with poor education in societal values and skills,
with the result that they are more likely to engage in delinquent activity); Hanson, Henggeler,
Haefele & Rodick, Demographic, Individual, and Family Relationship Correlates of Serious
and Repeated Crime Among Adolescents and Their Siblings, 52 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOLOGY 528, 529 (1984) ("during the past 15 years, there has been increased recognition
that the behavior problems of children and adolescents are often related to inoptimal family
relationship patterns"); Comment, supra note 5, at 1495-98.
179. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
180. See Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform, supra note 3.
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actions, and therefore restricts their rights and freedoms in many ways.
5 2
The societal attitudes reflected in these restrictions are not changed when
minors commit serious crimes; even juvenile murderers do not forfeit that
special place in society that all juveniles enjoy. .53 Thus, society's view that
all minors should enjoy special protection and care cannot be reconciled
with the retributive and punitive philosophies behind the death penalty. The
execution of persons for crimes committed while minors therefore violates
contemporary standards of decency regarding juveniles.
Society's standards, reflected in the presumption that minors are less
responsible for their actions than adults, are also relevant to an analysis of
the juvenile death penalty under the dignity of man principle of the eighth
amendment. 5 4 This principle focuses primarily on the personal responsibiity
and maturity of the offender. 5 5 Society's assumptions about the irrespon-
sibility of minors are corroborated by criminological assumptions regarding
the reduced responsibility of minors for their crimes, leading to the conclusion
that the death penalty always violates the dignity of man principle when
applied to a minor.
III. THE DIGNITY OF MAN AND TH JUVENmLE DEATH PENALTY
A punishment violates the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause if it is excessive. 56 A punishment is excessive if it is dispro-
portionate to the offense or if it fails to make a measurable contribution
to the penological goals of retribution and the deterrence of prospective
offenders.' 57 The death penalty per se has passed both tests. 5 8
Each instance of capital punishment, however, must be examined for
disproportionality and for its contribution to the goals of retribution and
deterrence. Currently, the sentencing authority must consider youth as a
mitigating factor, if proffered by the defendant. 59 As a mitigating factor,
youth could weigh against imposition of the death penalty on the grounds
that death is a disproportionate punishment for a youthful offender or that
valid penological goals would not be served by executing a youthful offender.
Some minors would still be executed, however, since sentencers are free to
impose the death penalty in spite of mitigating factors profferred by the
defendant. 6 The following sections will demonstrate that the death penalty
152. See supra notes 99-135 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 136-50 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 37-52 and accompanying text.
158. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176-87 (1976).
159. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
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is unconstitutional in all instances in which a juvenile has committed a
murder. Since the eighth amendment requires absolute certainty regarding
the validity of each death sentence, even a substantial doubt regarding the
legitimacy of the death penalty in a particular case is enough to render the
punishment unconstitutional.' 6 If the requisite certainty is lacking whenever
a juvenile is convicted of a capital crime, than a death penalty for minors
must be per se unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court's disproportionality analysis requires that in every
capital case, courts examine not only the magnitude of the harm, but also
the personal responsibility of the offender for the harm. 162 The punishment
must be proportionate in light of "relevant facets of the character and record
of the individual offender," which indicate whether the person to be put to
death is as culpable as others receiving a similar punishment for having
caused a similar harm.6 3 Thus, if minors who kill are always less responsibile
than their adult counterparts, then minors must never be subjected to the
maximum penalty to which adults are subject for the same crime.
The personal characteristics of each defendant are also examined in de-
termining whether each instance of capital punishment promotes valid pen-
ological goals.'6 The retributive goal of the death penalty is to assuage
society's moral outrage at criminal acts and desire that offenders be given
the punishments they deserve.' 65 If society feels less moral outrage when a
juvenile kills, and juveniles always deserve less than adult punishment due
to a lower level of culpability for their crimes, then the juvenile death penalty
will never further the retributive purpose of captial punishment.
The death penalty serves the deterrence goal if an execution will send a
message to potential offenders contemplating a similar act that they might
suffer a similar fate.1'6 If some inherent characteristics of youth would
prevent this message from being sent or received, the juvenile death penalty
will fail to serve the deterrence goal in all instances.
In the following sections, the Note will demonstrate that the juvenile death
penalty is disproportionate and falls to promote valid penological goals in
every case, due to the immaturity of juveniles. Society's conclusive pre-
sumptions regarding juvenile incapacity, reflected in legislative and judicial
attitudes toward minors, apply to all minors, even those convicted of violent
crimes. Thus, the inherent irresponsibility and immaturity of juveniles sug-
gests a reduced degree of culpability for their crimes. Criminological evidence
161. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
163. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 208, 304 (1976)). See supra note 40.
164. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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provides direct support for the proposition that juveniles are never as culpable
as adult criminals, tending to show that juveniles are not fully responsible
for their crimes. Although no single factor can be identified as the cause of
juvenile crime, 67 enough causal factors beyond the control of the individual
have been identified to raise at least a presumption that the juvenile criminal
is less responsible than his or her adult counterpart. 68 Coupled with society's
presumptions regarding juvenile crime, the criminological evidence is suffi-
cient to raise at least a substantial doubt that death is an appropriate penalty
for the juvenile murderer, which fails to satisfy the very high standards of
reliability which apply to capital sentencing.
A. Disproportionality and the Responsibility of Minors Who Kill
In general, society assumes that minors are less responsible than adults
due to their inherent immaturity. The Supreme Court has accepted the
premise that minors are less mature in their ability to make sound judgments
or to appreciate the consequences of their actions. 69 That society has also
conclusively adopted this premise is illustrated by the many special laws
designed to protect minors from their own irresponsibility and inability to
make reasoned choices, laws which do not apply to adults. 70
These ideas carry over into the realm of juvenile criminology. The existence
of a separate juvenile justice system is based on the theory that minors are
less responsible than adults, and therefore deserve to be treated less harshly
than adult offenders.' 7' Even serious crimes by minors do not alter the
presumptions that minors are less responsible than adults and deserve less
punishment. 72
167. See, e.g., D. GMBONS, DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR 96-100 (3d ed. 1981) (no single factor
causing juvenile delinquency exists in all cases, but a large set of factors has been identified
which interact in particular ways to produce delinquency).
168. See infra notes 161-99 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) ("Most children, even in adolescence,
simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions."); Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) ("during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors
often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could
be detrimental to them"); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("a child ... is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is
the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees") (citation omitted).
170. See supra notes 100-35 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 5; see also Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 5, at 515-
16; Paulsen, Kent v. U.S.: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv.
167, 169.
172. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TAsK FORCE, supra note 76, at 7 ("Crimes committed
by youths may be just as harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they
deserve less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control their conduct
and to think in long-range terms than adults.") The principle of diminished responsibility has
been explicitly applied to the crime of murder. See, e.g., id at 17 ("The principle of diminished
responsibility makes life imprisonment and death penalties inappropriate in such cases.")
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Youth is a turbulent phase of life during which one is more inclined to
participate in anti-social activities and criminal conduct.17 3 Research indicates
that as people get older, their propensities to commit crime decrease, so that
by the time they reach their early twenties they commit fewer offenses.'7 1
But during the "crisis of adolescence,"'' 75 when minors are thought to be
"most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage,' ' 76 minors are
exposed to many forces which encourage crime, including violent crime. The
Supreme Court has recognized, for example, that evidence of a "turbulent
family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe emotional
disturbance is particularly relevant" in determining the proper punishment
for a minor.' 77 Youth crime is widely believed to be caused by a failure of
family, school and other social systems that share responsibility for the
proper development of minors. 7 8 In other words, juvenile offenders are not
wholly responsible for their crimes.
The conclusion that minors are less responsible for their crimes than adults
is not changed by the fact that many juvenile offenders are tried in the
criminal courts. It has already been shown that the transfer of juveniles to
the adult courts does not involve a determination that minors are as mature
and responsible as adults.' 79 Although the transfer of minors may be justified
by their dangerousness or non-amenability to treatment in the juvenile sys-
tem,'8 0 the fact that transfer does not mean a minor is mature enough to
control or understand his actions indicates that minors tried in criminal court
are still less responsible for their crimes than their adult counterparts.
Under the disproportionality analysis described above, which focuses on
the responsibility of the individual in relation to others facing the same
173. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE, supra note 76, at 3; Comment, supra
note 104, at 437.
174. See Zimring, American Youth Violence: Issues and Trends, in 1 CRIME AND JUSTICE:
AN ANNUAL REvIEw OF REsEARCH 67 (N. Morris & M. Tonry eds. 1979); Simpson, Rehabilitation
as the Justification of a Separate Juvenile Justice System, 64 CALEF. L. REv. 984, 1011-12
(1976); see also Feld, Legislative Policies, supra note 5, at 509-10 (youthful offenders likely to
desist from serious crime after one offense).
175. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948).
176. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982).
177. Id.
178. See supra notes 76 & 82 and accompanying text; see also Sorrells, What Can Be Done
About Juvenile Homicide? 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 152, 153-55 (1980) (concluding that minors
who kill come from violent and chaotic family backgrounds); Pink, Schools, Youth and Justice,
30 CsruE & DELINQ. 439, 444 (1984) (schools contribute to delinquency by placing some students
in "low trajectory" programs, providing them with poor education in societal values and skills,
with the result that they are more likely to engage in delinquent activity); Hanson, Henggeler,
Haefele & Rodick, Demographic, Individual, and Family Relationship Correlates of Serious
and Repeated Crime Among Adolescents and Their Siblings, 52 J. CONSr.nNo & CLINICAL
PSYCHOLOGY 528, 529 (1984) ("during the past 15 years, there has been increased recognition
that the behavior problems of children and adolescents are often related to inoptimal family
relationship patterns"); Comment, supra note 5, at 1495-98.
179. See supra note 81 and accormpanying text.
180. See Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform, supra note 3.
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punishment for a similar crime, the death penalty is always disproportionate
for minors,' 8' since minors are always less responsible for their crimes than
adults.
B. The Lack of Penological Justification for a Juvenile Death
Penalty
1. Retribution
Capital punishment for minors is not justified as a means for society to
express its moral outrage at juvenile crime, or as an alternative to citizens
taking the law into their own hands to satisfy their desire for vengeance.
8 2
The danger of vigilantism is less acute in the case of juvenile murderers,
since society should experience less moral outrage at juvenile crime than at
adult crime.' 3 One commentator has argued that "the best thing that can
be said for [retribution] is that it restores balance on an imaginary tote
board of social rights and wrongs.'1 4 Since society presumes that minors
are less responsible for their crimes, partly because society must share the
blame,' punishing juveniles does less to redress the social imbalance created
by their crimes. The imposition of a criminal penalty short of execution
upon a minor accused of murder should be sufficient to soothe the anger
of society. 8 6
Retribution also satisfies society's desire that criminals suffer the punish-
ments they deserve. 8 7 This theory of retribution is based on personal culp-
181. See supra note 40.
182. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (discussing the retributive goals of
capital punishment).
183. That society experiences less moral outrage at juvenile capital crime is illustrated by the
reluctance of courts and juries to impose the death penalty on juveniles. See supra notes 80-
83 and accompanying text; see also Jolly & Sagarin, supra note 86, at 612 (teenagers and
female murderers will arouse sympathy of general public, even though support for death penalty
gederally has grown); Streib, supra note 67, at 637 ("[e]ven if the execution of an adult solely
for revenge is constitutionally permissible, this justification of capital punishment is less ap-
pealing when the object of righteous vengeance is a child").
184. Little, The Law of Sentencing as Public Ceremony, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 1, 3 (1983).
185. See supra notes 76 & 82 and accompanying text.
186. In this regard, the reluctance of juries to impose the death penalty on minors, see supra
notes 83-87 and accompanying text, is again relevant, indicating that society's moral outrage
is satisfied by lesser punishments than death. See Jolly & Sagarin, supra note 86, at 618 (juries
will seek to find juvenile murderers guilty of lesser charges rather than impose the death
penalty); see also Leatherwood v. State, 435 So. 2d 645, 660 (Miss. 1983) (Hawkins, J.,
dissenting) (in arguing against the necessity of capital punishment for a minor: "From whence
comes the notion that sentence to life imprisonment is not in itself a terrible punishment? Are
we required in this case to impose that very worst sentence society is empowered to impose in
any case?") (original emphasis).
187. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183-84.
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ability, or moral blameworthiness, 8' and therefore requires an investigation
of the personal responsibility of each defendant. 89 As this Note has shown,
juvenile murderers are always less responsible for their actions, and are less
morally blameworthy, than adult murderers.' 9° Therefore, they will never
deserve as great a punishment as their adult counterparts.
2. Deterrence
Deterrence is a justification for the death penalty because it sends a message
to potential murderers that they might suffer a similar punishment if they
commit the contemplated crime. '9' The requirement that each execution serve
as a deterrent requires an examination of the personal characteristics of the
person to be executed, since the deterrence message is likely to be received
only by persons who can readily identify with the condemned. 92 The exe-
cution of minors would not send the deterrence message to potential adult
murderers, who would be unlikely to identify with a minor who is executed,
due to the difference in ages. 93
Moreover, the execution of minors would not likely deter other minors,
since few minors would receive the deterrence message. The Supreme Court
has recognized that "capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when
murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation." 94 For deterrence
to work, potential offenders must comprehend the threat of punishment and
adjust their conduct accordingly. 9 It is unlikely, however, that free will and
rational calculation are involved when juveniles commit crimes. 96 Society
188. See Gardiner, The Renaissance of Retribution-An Examination of Doing Justice, 1976
Wis. L. REv. 781, 798; Gibbs, The Death Penalty, Retribution and Penal Policy, 69 J. CUM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 291, 293 (1978) (retributive doctrine emphasizes prosecuting individuals
charged with crime as morally responsible beings).
189. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 169-81 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
193. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1510-11; see also A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INsNITY DEFENSE
13 (1967) (indicating punishment of persons with different characteristics has little impact on
potential offenders). Commentators have also argued that the failure to execute an offender
who is noticeably different from the rest of the population, such as a minor or an insane
person, will not detract from the deterrent effect of the punishment, so long as the punishment
is still imposed upon ordinary members of the population. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 5,
at 1511 & n.226.
194. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 484 (1946).
195. See Andenaes, supra note 50, at 958; Gardiner, The Purpose of Criminal Punishment,
21 MOD. L. REv. 117, 122 (1958); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 301 (1972)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (deterrence is possible only if a criminal rationally weighs consequences
of his intended crime).
196.
In sum, although some youths' involvement in delinquency may be related to
cost-benefit decisions and to a rational process, other explanations better explain
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clearly assumes that minors who commit crimes are less able to appreciate
the consequences of their actions than adults. 97 Moreover, the execution of
juveniles would do little to deter the societal and environmental factors that
lead to juvenile crime. 9 Youth crime is not wholly deliberative or based on
a consideration of possible consequences. Rather, it is caused at least in part
by societal factors beyond the offender's control. 99 Thus, the deterrent
message of punishment cannot be expected to cause minors to modify their
actions rationally so as to avoid crime and punishment.200
Potential juvenile murderers would also fail to identify with others put to
death for crimes committed while juveniles. Most juveniles view death as a
remote possibility, and are therefore likely to engage in death-defying be-
havior. Thus, the threat of capital punishment can actually encourage the
commission of capital crimes by juveniles. 20 '
Even minors who have the capacity to understand the threat of punishment
may not have developed sufficient control over their behavior to modify
the delinquent behavior of most youths. With the vast majority of youngsters,
delinquent behavior arises without much forethought as they interact with their
environment. With still other youths, compulsive behavior, the influence of alcohol
or drugs, or intense emotional reaction to a situation seem to lead them to bypass
any rational process.
C. BARToLLAs, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 102 (1985); see also P. HAHN, THE JUVENILE OFFENDER
AND THE LAW 40-57 (2d ed. 1978) (free will and rational choice not among various behavioral
theories explaining the causes of delinquency).
197. See supra notes 169-81 and accompanying text; see also Kastenbaum, Time and Death
in Adolescence, in Tim MEANINO OF DEATH 99 (H. Feifel ed. 1959) (minors tend to live for
today, with little thought for future implications of their actions); Kastenbaum, Death and
Development Through the Life Span, in NEw MEAlINGS OF DEATH 33 (H. Feifel ed. 1977)
(young people are often encouraged to engage in risk-taking or death-defying behavior by
cultural and societal influences).
198. See P. HAHN, supra note 189, at 342 (given environmental, social and emotional causes
of youth crime, deterrent value of punishment of juveniles is questionable).
199. See supra notes 76, 82 & 178 and accompanying text.
200.
The chief reason why a repressive response to youth crime will not work is that
the logic underlying this approach is fundamentally flawed. This neoclassical
approach assumes that youth crime takes place only when youthful offenders have
calculated rationally the costs and benefits of crime, but more commonly, youth
crime takes place as the result of juveniles being impoverished, addicted to drugs,
emotionally distraught, or influenced by peers. That is, most youthful offenders
merely respond to the needs and emotions of a particular moment.
C. BARTOLLA S, supra note 196, at 104.
201. See Streib, supra note 67, at 638-39; Reinhold, supra note 68; see also Jones & Potter,
Deterence, Retribution, Denunciation and the Death Penalty, 49 UMKC L. REv. 158, 168-69
(1981) ("Unfortunately, there is a kind of excitement and allure surrounding death by violence;
the daring risk of one's own death is enticing to some."). Some studies of the deterrent effect
of capital punishment have concluded that the death penalty can actually increase homicide
rates. See, e.g., Forst, Cdpital Punishment and Deterrence: Conflicting Evidence?, 74 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMNOLOGY 927, 938 (1983).
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their actions accordingly. 2 2 For example, minors often succumb to peer
pressure to commit crimes, despite, or even because of, the dangerous con-
sequences.
20 1
Even if one believes that minors would be aware of the death penalty and
could include that possibility in their deliberations about a murder, the death
penalty would still be an ineffective deterrent. The certainty of receiving a
punishment, and not its severity, is the primary source of a punishment's
deterrent effect,204 and it is very uncertain that even a convicted juvenile
murderer will receive the death penalty. Juries are reluctant to impose the
death penalty on minors, while courts of appeal will often overturn a death
penalty due to the mitigating factor of youth.205 The resulting uncertainty
that death will be the penalty limits the deterrent effect of capital punishment
even on a minor contemplating both a murder and the possible consequences
of that act.
206
Since capital punishment for minors is unlikely to deter minors from
crime, it fails to make a measurable contribution to the penological goal of
deterrence. Since the retributive goal is also not served by the execution of
persons for juvenile crimes, the juvenile death penalty is clearly excessive,
in violation of the dignity of man principle.
CONCLUSION
This Note refutes the constitutionality, as well as the moral propriety, of
the juvenile death penalty, by exploring contemporary standards of decency
202. In recent years, many jurisdictions have attempted to "scare juveniles straight" by
allowing them to visit penitentiaries and be confronted by convicts, so that they can observe
the possible consequences of delinquent behavior first-hand. See generally R. LUNDmAN, PRE-
VENTION AND CONTROL OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 137-52 (1984). Efforts to scare juveniles
straight are based on a deterrence rationale, and on the assumption that rational juveniles will
choose to forego crime if they perceive that the costs of crime (punishment) will outweigh the
benefits. Id. at 137-38. Unfortunately, most "scared straight" programs have not had an impact
on juvenile crime rates, while involvement in delinquency has actually increased among the
participants in some programs. Id. at 150-52. One implication of such results is that minors
are unable to avoid crime, even after they have been informed of the probable consequences
of criminal behavior.
203. See E. ERICKSON, CILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 261-63 (2d ed. 1963); Zimring, Kids, Groups
and Crime: Some Implications of a Well-Known Secret, 72 J. CRIM.'L. & CRIMDNOLOGY 867,
876 (1981).
204. Little, supra note 184, at 14; Moffit, Learning Theory Model of Punishment: Impli-
cations for Delinquency Deterrence, 10 CRIm. JUST. & BEHAV. 131, 148 (1983) (classical cri-
minology maintains it is certainty of punishment, not severity, that deters); Andenaes, General
Prevention Revisited: Research and Policy Implications, 66 J. CRIM. L. & CRBMNOLOGY 338
(1975); see also Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908 (1982) (arguing
that capital punishment does not serve deterrence function, because constitutional safeguards
in capital sentencing system make death sentences uncertain and rare).
205. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
206. See generally Moffit, supra note 204, at 152-53 (increased severity of punishment has
little effect on juveniles because punishment becomes uncertain and is delayed as severity
increases); Note, supra note 63, at 369 (death penalty is inflicted so infrequently on minors,
it fails to have a deterrent effect).
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reflected in the law's protective attitude toward minors. The idea of executing
a person for a crime committed during minority raises the "deepest questions
about the demands of justice versus the special nature of childhood. ' 20 7
Even if such questions raised only a doubt about the propriety of putting
persons to death for juvenile crimes, such a doubt must be resolved against
the death penalty. The law requires certainty in capital sentencing, in order
that the death penalty be consistent in every case with "the fundamental
respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment." 28
Under the eighth amendment dignity of man analysis, the juvenile death
penalty again fails to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Society's assumptions
about youthful irresponsibility and immaturity carry over even into the realm
of violent crime, and render the juvenile death penalty excessive in every
instance. As this Note makes clear, society must always regard juvenile
offenders as less responsible for their crimes than adults, so that the death
penalty is always disproportionate for minors. Since minors are less respon-
sible for their crimes, and hence less morally blameworthy, the retributive
goal of the death penalty is not served by putting minors to death, either
as a means for society to express its moral outrage or as a means of meting
out to juvenile murderers their just desserts. Finally, because the crimes of
minors are typically not the result of premeditation and deliberation, and
because the likelihood of a juvenile death penalty is remote even where
permitted, the juvenile death penalty will not have a sufficient deterrent
effect to pass constitutional muster.
The consideration of youth as a mitigating factor is clearly insufficient
to guarantee the constitutional requirement of certainty in capital sentencing.
Individualized consideration of juvenile murderers, with youth only as a
mitigating factor, still allows minors to be sentenced to death in violation
of eighth amendment principles. When the Supreme Court next considers
the juvenile death penalty, it should find that the very special place in society
occupied by minors does not include death row.
LAWRENCE A. VANoRE
207. Streib, supra note 67, at 641.
208. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (quoting Woodson v. Nbrth Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
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